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ABSTRACT 
This study looks at the community of Shanghai Jews in its diversity, 1930s-1940s, then at 
its interactions in 1949 with the American Jewish communities of Atlanta and New York as 
Shanghai Jews were transported across the United States in sealed trains. This exploration 
supports the argument that Shanghai Jewish refugees and American Jewish communities existed 
in an interdependent relationship at the close of the 1940s. Through an exploration of individual 
and institutional interactions in Shanghai, Atlanta, and New York, with an emphasis on media, 
this study questions what these interactions tell us–and do not tell us–about both the host and 
refugee communities. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 2, 1949, approximately five hundred Shanghai Jews left China on a 
steamship. Once they reached San Francisco, California, they then crossed the United States in a 
sealed 20-car diesel train and eventually departed New York under supervised guard, en route to 
destinations including Israel, Italy, and Austria. While only a few hundred in number, the 
Shanghai Jewish refugees’ experiences on their month-long journey brought together a panoply 
of events and sociopolitical forces of global magnitude.  
 The Chinese Civil War between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the United 
States-backed Kuomintang (KMT) culminated in the spring of 1949, when Mao Zedong’s CCP 
forces approached the international city of Shanghai. Amidst rumors and fears surrounding the 
arrival of the Civil War on their doorstep, thousands of foreigners fled the country to avoid being 
caught in the crosshairs of the conflict. A diverse community of Shanghai Jews, whose numbers 
had expanded with the influx of Holocaust refugees in the late 1930s, was among those seeking 
escape from the port city. They sought exit routes through Canada, Italy, and the United States in 
the early months of 1949, with the assistance of the United Nations-appointed International 
Refugee Organization and several Jewish welfare institutions. In May 1949, Mao’s forces 
reached Shanghai and Chiang Kai-shek and his forces fled, eventually settling in Taiwan.  
The United States, whose strict nation-based immigration policy prevented thousands 
from escaping to America from Nazi-occupied Europe during World War II, remained locked in 
a decades-long political battle over harsh immigration legislation. Nativist fears and rapidly-
shifting foreign policies barred many refugees and displaced persons from entering the United 
States, including those seeking to leave China. The restrictive Displaced Persons Act of 1948 
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locked Harry Truman’s administration and the conservative 80th and 81st Congresses in a war of 
words while thousands were refused immigration visas. 
 Many Jewish non-governmental organizations encouraged Shanghai Jews to escape the 
encroaching Civil War via immigration to Israel, a nation also embroiled in a series of civil wars 
between Arab and Jewish forces. Great Britain withdrew its colonial infrastructure in the wake of 
World War II, and the United Nations adopted a resolution dividing the territory and sparking a 
bloody territorial conflict between Jewish and Arab residents. In May 1948, David Ben-Gurion 
announced the establishment of Eretz-Israel, the Land of Israel. Hours after its founding, four 
surrounding nations declared war on Israel. The United States became the first country to 
recognize Israel’s provisional government, despite disagreement from within Truman’s 
administration. The Arab-Israeli War inflamed the region in the months that followed. 
 In February and March of 1949, a confluence of events took place: Israel and select Arab 
nations signed armistices to conclude the Arab-Israeli War; amendments to the U.S. Displaced 
Persons Act failed to pass in Congress; and the Chinese Communist Party advanced within 
striking distance of Shanghai. The Shanghai Jewish sealed train provides a track through this 
vast, transnational story connecting immigration policy, institutional competition, and individual 
agency.     
I have the Shanghai Jewish community to thank for connecting my own academic and 
professional interests, as presented in this study. My undergraduate studies in East Asian history 
were supplemented by summers studying at the Beijing Language and Culture University, 
Bahrom Institute of Seoul Women’s University, and a scholar laureate program in China and 
Tibet. When I accepted a position at Kennesaw State University’s Museum of History and 
Holocaust Education at Kennesaw State University, I thought my China studies would be 
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sidelined for the time. On the contrary, the museum’s professional network connected me to 
scholars and to literature on the expansive reach of Jewish diaspora, including the Shanghai 
Jewish community during World War II. In the years that followed, contacts in China alerted me 
to a preservation project of the Shanghai Jewish ghetto and the establishment of a museum 
dedicated to the refugees’ memory. My research track was set when Dr. Marni Davis, my advisor 
and associate professor of history at Georgia State University (GSU), alerted me to a series of 
sealed trains carrying Shanghai Jews through Atlanta in the late 1940s, and when Dr. Douglas 
Reynolds, GSU professor of history, provided the context and guidance through a directed 
reading focused on the Shanghai Jewish community.  
This present study examines a series of interactions between Shanghai and American 
Jewish communities that took place across two continents and two decades, with the sealed 
transport of the Shanghai Jews through the United States as the narrative anchor. I argue that the 
Shanghai Jewish refugees and American Jewish communities existed in an interdependent 
relationship.1 The passage of Shanghai Jews across the United States provided American Jewish 
leadership with a platform where they could discuss local institutional pressures alongside 
transnational issues like immigration. In turn, the efforts of the American Jewish communities 
provided resources, connections, and political support so that the plight of the Shanghai Jewish 
refugees became of international concern, putting pressure on the U.S. 81st Congress to amend 
restrictive immigration legislation.  
As the Shanghai Jews crossed the Pacific Ocean and landed in San Francisco in February 
1949, American Jewish communities rallied in their support. Media reports illustrate how Jewish 
                                                 
1 For an exploration of interdependent versus interconnected relationships, see Lynn Hunt, 
Writing World History in the Global Era (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014). 
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organizational leaders in Atlanta and New York evaluated their responsibility to these refugees 
and estimated the resources and connections they could provide. In many ways, we discover as 
much about American Jewish institutions as we do about Shanghai Jews through the narratives 
of front pages and the insights of handwritten memos. 
By studying the Shanghai Jews and their interactions with American Jewish 
communities, we uncover a degree of agency and diversity often overlooked by larger refugee 
narratives. Through individual and institutional histories, I explore the ways select community 
members processed and shaped their environments through interaction with each other and in 
response to their own contexts. The experiences of these Shanghai Jews crack open the 
monolithic portrayal of Jewish refugees in World War II-era China and exhibits how 
communities splintered and came together at varying times and for varying reasons. Despite the 
restrictive circumstances, these refugees tapped into the communication networks of 
transnational aid organizations and even successfully negotiated for supplies and administrative 
support.  
In order to understand the context of this transnational history and the diversity of its 
actors, chapter one begins with an examination of the Shanghai Jewish community before, 
during, and after World War II. Chapter two explores the political, economic, and institutional 
environment that surrounded arrangements for the sealed transports, then follows the Shanghai 
Jewish refugees across the Pacific Ocean.  
Chapters three and four expound upon the Shanghai Jews’ experiences while in the 
United States. Thanks to a series of media reports and supporting institutional records, two 
communities provide the opportunity for case studies: Atlanta and New York. Chapter three 
focuses on the Shanghai Jews’ stop in Atlanta, followed by chapter four in New York. In 
5 
addition to an overview of the refugees’ experiences while in Atlanta and New York, these final 
two chapters examine each local community’s institutional environment in order to understand 
the leaderships’ responses to the Shanghai Jewish transports. I close each chapter with an 
analysis of the rhetoric employed by local newspapers to interpret the Shanghai Jewish refugees 
within the context of their own environments. 
The history of post-World War II Shanghai Jews is rarely told, although their wartime 
experiences are becoming a subfield of academic and public history. Despite the numerous 
opportunities to discuss themes of immigration, nation-state formation, and transnational 
experiences, the Shanghai Jewish narrative is beset by challenges ranging from a dearth of 
primary sources to the sheer volume of actors and stages required for a story of this scope. This 
complication, however, also serves as an impetus for this present study. How may we transcend 
conventional narrative bookends, including ports, wars, and archival collections, to investigate 
these histories pockmarked by missing sources and conflicting forces?2 Can limited perspectives 
within a microhistory provide a compelling history and exhibit change over time? The following 
study is a narrow opening between larger historical epochs, but one that will hopefully inspire 
others to swing open the door when they encounter sources and perspectives that complicate, 
contradict, or concur with these findings.  
1.1 Literature Review 
 In the past fifteen years, the field of Jewish diasporic studies in East Asia 
experienced a surge of interest, with particular attention paid to the plight of European Jews in 
                                                 
2 Inquiries into historical and archival silences are inspired by Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing 
the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 6-13. 
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Shanghai during World War II.3 Prior to this proliferation of academic interest, select scholars 
laid the foundation for the Jewish experience in Shanghai. Most notable are David Kranzler’s 
Japanese, Nazis & Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938-1945, an expansive 
tome focusing on political and ideological relations between the various communities, and 
Jonathan Goldstein’s two-volume The Jews in China, born out of a 1992 conference focused on 
the broader topic of Judaic experience in East Asia.4 While Goldstein’s compilation emphasizes 
the Kaifeng Jews, select essays regarding identity and religious traditions may be laterally 
connected to twentieth-century diasporic experiences. Another strength of The Jews of China is 
essays by scholars who later became foundational in the field, including Irene Eber and Marcia 
Ristaino. 
The increase of academic interest coincided with the publication of memoirs by Shanghai 
Jewish refugees, including those of Ernest Heppner, who also contributed an essay to Jonathan 
Goldstein’s volumes.5 While Heppner is not a trained historian, his carefully detailed memoir 
adds insight into the layout and institutional operations of the Shanghai Ghetto, as well as notes 
                                                 
3 For reasons related to this surge of interest, see Joshua Fogel, “The Recent Boom in Shanghai 
Studies,” Journal of the History of Ideas 71, no. 2 (2010): 313-333 and Marcia Ristaino, Port of 
Last Resort: The Diaspora Communities of Shanghai (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2001), 158. 
4 David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis & Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938-
1945 (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1978); Jonathan Goldstein, ed., The Jews of China: 
Historical and Comparative Perspectives (Vol. 1), with an introduction by Jonathan Goldstein 
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999) and Jonathan Goldstein, ed., The Jews of China: 
A Sourcebook and Research Guide (Vol. 2), with an introduction by Jonathan Goldstein 
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000). 
5 Ernest Heppner, “The Relations between the Western European Refugees and the Shanghai 
Resident Jews; A Personal Memoir,” in The Jews of China (Vol. 2): 57-69. 
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concerning cultural life, quotidian schedules, and fluctuating relations between diverse sub-
identities within the Jewish community.6   
Heppner’s memoir pairs well with Irene Eber’s Voices from Shanghai, which brings to 
light significant socioeconomic divides within the Jewish community and non-Jewish 
community, and provides primary sources that fracture assumptions of a monolithic experience 
within the Shanghai Ghetto. 7 Eber’s interdisciplinary work pairs testimonies, poems, and 
photographs of Jewish experiences in Shanghai with brief narrative analyses.  
One of the most significant trends within East Asian Jewish studies is a movement away 
from a binary Ashkenazic-Sephardic divide and toward a more complex, nuanced, and 
socioeconomic treatment of the communities. Irene Eber’s greatest academic contribution, 
Wartime Shanghai and the Jewish Refugees from Central Europe: Survival, Co-existence, and 
Identity in a Multi-Ethnic City, underscores this historiographical development.8 Eber’s 2012 
publication ties together thirty years of research while refocusing the narrative on a specific 
group of Central European Jews. Maisie Meyer exhibits a similar methodology with her analysis 
of the Sephardic (Baghdadi) experience in Shanghai, which Gao Bei, an up-and-coming scholar 
known for her expert handling of multilingual sources, references frequently.9 
Gao Bei’s Shanghai Sanctuary: Chinese and Japanese Policy toward European Jewish 
Refugees during World War II provides a great service by incorporating Chinese and Japanese 
                                                 
6 Ernest Heppner, Shanghai Refuge: A Memoir of the World War II Jewish Ghetto (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1993). 
7 Irene Eber, Voices from Shanghai: Jewish Exiles in Wartime China (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009).leo 
8 Irene Eber, Wartime Shanghai and the Jewish Refugees from Central Europe: Survival, Co-
existence, and Identity in a Multi-Ethnic City (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 1, 4. 
9 Maisie Meyer, From the Rivers of Babylon to the Whangpoo: A Century of Sephardi Jewish 
Life in Shanghai (Lanham: University Press of America, 2003). 
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police records and administrative correspondence while situating the Jewish refugees’ 
experiences within a larger framework of international politics.10 Her sociopolitical analysis 
interweaves refugees experiences with unfulfilled plans by Japanese and Chinese officials to 
settle Jews in China as a means of tapping into a supposed—and anti-Semitically formulated—
global wealth network. Gao’s work surpasses even Eber’s in its use of primary sources, beyond 
Jewish perspectives, due to her expansive inclusion of policy, identity, and languages. 
Finally, Marcia Ristaino’s Port of Last Resort breaks the conventional mold by 
presenting a comparative study between Russian non-Jews and Jewish refugees, allowing 
significant linguistic, cultural, and spatial comparisons to be made in contradiction to an 
otherwise insularly Jewish story.11 Ristaino combines the memoir approach of Heppner and the 
analytical perspectives of Gao, Eber, and Kranzler in a powerful and compelling depiction of 
complex refugee experiences in Shanghai. This approach, much like Gao’s, is a compelling 
reminder that the experiences of Shanghai Jewish immigrants and refugees were deeply 
embedded within larger social, political, and economic contexts. Although Ristaino’s work is a 
tremendous contribution to the study of Jewish immigration and refugee experiences, it is limited 
to Jewish experiences while in China. Apart from a brief chapter at the end, it barely sets sail 
from the port of Shanghai. 
Publishing houses outside Europe and North America also exhibit an increased interest in 
Shanghai Jewish studies, although the conversation between scholars of variant linguistic 
backgrounds has, unsurprisingly, been limited. Recent Chinese publications attest to academic 
interest in the Shanghai Jewish refugee story, and they often are tied to historic preservation or 
                                                 
10 Gao Bei, Shanghai Sanctuary: Chinese and Japanese Policy toward European Jewish 
Refugees during World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
11 Ristaino, Port of Last Resort. 
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public history projects, as seen in Zhang Yanhua and Wang Jian’s Preserving the Shanghai 
Ghetto: Memories of Jewish Refugees in 1940’s [sic] China and Pan Guang’s Jews in China 
(Youtairen zai Zhongguo).12 These works are essential to my efforts to explore interconnections 
and variant experiences within the Shanghai Jewish experience. 
Secondary literature tracing the Jewish refugees’ departure from Shanghai and 
subsequent experiences is remarkably sparse, underscoring the tendency to view refugee and 
immigrant experiences as beginning or ending with ports of call. The Shanghai Jewish 
immigration trains receive a one-paragraph mention in Ristiano’s Port of Last Resort, and Steve 
Hochstadt touches on the narrative in his oral-history based, Auf Wiedersehen, Shanghai! But 
Where Do We Go?13 Deborah Dwork and Robert Jan Pelts also provide a one-paragraph analysis 
and allude to the “bittersweetness” of the Shanghai Jewish sealed train.14 Dalia Ofer provides a 
mention that a series of trains sparked media attention in 1949. 15 However, her exposition 
focuses on political and institutional relationships between Israel and funding organizations 
rather than the refugees’ experiences while in the United States. It is within this largely silent 
secondary narrative that this thesis bridges an emerging interest in Shanghai Jewish refugee 
experiences with the broader theoretical trends exhibited in historiography today, particularly in 
the areas of transcending borders, flattened identities, and archival silences. 
                                                 
12 Zhang Yanhua and Wang Jian, Preserving the Shanghai Ghetto: Memories of Jewish Refugees 
in 1940’s [sic] China, trans. Emrie Tomaiko (Encino: Bridge21 Publications, 2016); and Pan 
Guang, The Jews in China (Youtairen zai Zhongguo) (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 
2008). 
13 Steve Hochstadt, Auf Wiedersehen, Shanghai! But Where Do We Go?: Stories of Escape from 
the Third Reich (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).  
14 Deborah Dwork and Robert Jan Pelt, Flight from the Reich: Refugee Jews, 1933-1946 (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 322. 
15 Dalia Ofer, “The Israeli Government and Jewish Orghanizations [sic]: The case of the 
Immigration [sic] of Jews from Shanghai,” Studies in Zionism 11, no. 1 (1990), 67-80. 
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1.2 Primary Sources and Methodology 
This research emphasizes both individual experience as well as institutional and 
sociopolitical contexts. As such, secondary research is used alongside primary sources including 
Atlanta’s Southern Israelite, New York’s Aufbau, the papers of Sam Eplan and Jacob Friend at 
the William Breman Jewish Heritage Museum, and the institutional documents of the American 
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJJDC) and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) in 
New York. The most relevant primary sources include the records of the New York office of the 
AJJDC and correspondence between its New York and Shanghai offices; the German-language 
newspaper Aufbau, published by Verlag, whose recent digitization by the Leo Baeck Institute of 
New York allowed my translation of select articles previously unanalyzed in relationship to the 
sealed trains; and the records of the Southern Israelite, published in Atlanta by Southern 
Newspaper Enterprises, Inc., and available through the Digital Library of Georgia within the 
University System of Georgia.16 
My selection of Shanghai, Atlanta, and New York as comparative cities was not the result 
of throwing darts on a map. Rather, each city’s institutional records and media reports, as yet 
unexamined in relationship to each other, provide a prime opportunity for a transnational, 
comparative study. Historical narratives about Shanghai Jews often end at 1945, with perhaps a 
short chapter or prologue for the subsequent years. Yet the Shanghai Jewish community 
experienced a critical tipping point four years after World War II, when the international city 
became caught between the forces of the Chinese Civil War. Atlanta and New York, meanwhile, 
                                                 
16 Dwork and Jan Pelt did briefly mention Aufbau coverage of 1949 sealed trains and the 
newspaper’s coverage of later evacuation efforts from Shanghai, however their work is focused 
on 1933-1946 and therefore understandably does not include an in-depth analysis of Aufbau 
articles related to the sealed trains. See Dwork and Jan Pelt, Flight from the Reich, 322.  
11 
provide institutional and media sources directly related to the Shanghai Jews’ sealed transports. I 
anticipate primary sources to emerge from other cities where the transports stopped—most 
hopefully San Francisco and New Orleans—that will strengthen future comparative studies on 
this topic and provide perspectives underrepresented in this study, including explorations on 
gender and intersectionality. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee’s diverse and 
numerous archival documents in New York were exceptionally persuasive in my selection of 
New York as a focal point along the Shanghai Jews’ journey. While lacking New York’s wealth 
of primary resources related to the sealed transport, the recent digitization of Atlanta’s Southern 
Israelite provided the opportunity to investigate Atlanta as a case study. 
Atlanta and New York offer a challenging opportunity to explore the ecological 
differences between the cities.17 Both served as urban hubs for their regions, and the newspapers, 
federations, and leadership of each city often were perceived by their wide-spread communities 
as the local authoritative voices. New York’s national and international reputation as a thriving 
center for Jewish life in the mid-twentieth century was significantly different from the perception 
of Atlanta’s Jewish community as an outpost of only regional significance.18 
  As a note on terminology, these Shanghai Jews frequently moved between several 
identifying terms. Refugee, immigrant, resident, and displaced person are all used to describe 
Shanghai Jews depending on shifting statuses and situations. As will be explored, these terms 
often were used based on their rhetorical impact rather than their political reality. Refugee, for 
instance, could denote either a refugee from Nazi Germany or a refugee from the Chinese Civil 
                                                 
17 See Mark Bauman, The Southerner As American: Jewish Style (Cincinnati: American Jewish 
Archives, 1996), 21. 
18 The ecological differences of New York’s international reputation and the “outpost” status of 
Atlanta were explored in conversation with Dr. Marni Davis, November 2017. 
12 
War; at times, the term meant both. Immigrant, on the other hand, suggests a politically 
authorized destination, such as the United States or Israel. This nomenclature was much desired 
by the Shanghai Jewish community but often remained elusive, and therefore is used far less 
frequently in both historical and contemporary representations. Emigration, on the other hand, 
only applies to a portion of the Shanghai Jewish community. Residents of China emigrated from 
Shanghai, however recently-arrived European refugees could hardly be said to emigrate from a 
country which they regarded only as a way-station. Displaced persons occupied the most salient 
political identity, and perhaps also the most useful for purposes of immigration. Its political 
meaning served as the basis for legislative disputes and newspaper headlines half a world away 
from the same Shanghai Jews who wished to obtain its assurances. 
This research is possible only through theoretical contributions of scholars who have 
broken ground within the field of world history. Foundationally, Benedict Anderson’s theory of 
“imagined communities” resonate throughout the investigations and perspectives of this thesis. 19 
How did nation-state anxieties feed into local contexts, and how did these dynamically shifting 
perceptions of “self” and “other” influence Shanghai Jewish experiences in the face of political 
immigration battles within the United States?20 As concerns surrounding immigration increased 
in Shanghai and the United States, so too did bureaucratic attempts to understand and police the 
situation. The creation of more documentation, paperwork, policies, and studies to investigate 
and control these immigrant populations provide a connection to Foucauldian power-knowledge 
                                                 
19 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (New York: Verson, 1983). 
20 For a review of the creation of the “other,” see Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1978). 
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structures.21 Michel Foucault argues that knowledge is the fertile ground in which power roots 
and later blooms. As an idea is explored and discussed within society, more expansive and 
diffuse constraints are developed around the expanding boundaries of the power-driven idea.  
Yet despite the proliferation of bureaucratic paperwork and policies at national borders, 
those borders remained porous. Inspired by Libby Garland’s investigations into illegal Jewish 
immigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this present study takes note of the ways 
Shanghai Jewish refugees discovered and then slipped through policy loopholes to cross 
otherwise hardened nation-state boundaries.22 As Garland argues throughout her work, After 
They Closed the Gates, the notion of nationhood is as fluid as the ports themselves. Similarly, 
this research seeks to transcend geographical boundaries to follow transnational experiences 
beyond the nation-state. 
The diasporic theory of Stuart Hall argues that many host communities “flatten” 
immigrant identities at ports of entry and within public memory. 23 Diverse, dynamic individuals 
are melted down and reconstituted into a consumable group for the host community. That 
transmutation is, in turn, often internalized by the diasporic community itself. By examining the 
pre-refugee train experiences of the Shanghai Jewish community, this study attempts to avoid the 
trap of flattening refugee identities within any narrow slice of time or place. Despite this 
aspiration, this approach risks a historical flattening of my own making due to my evaluation of 
complex American Jewish communities through the narrow lenses of institutional documents 
                                                 
21 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990). 
22 Libby Garland, After They Closed the Gates: Jewish Illegal Immigration to the United States, 
1921-1965 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
23 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, ed. 
Jonathan Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 227-228. 
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and media reports. To guard against this flattening and exhibit the diversity of institutional and 
ethnic communities, I pay careful attention to individuals who operated within these 
organizations and newspaper outlets.  
Finally, a significant influence is the theory of Michel-Rolph Trouillot, whose work 
draws attention to “silences” that emerge in the course of historical scholarship.24 Trouillot 
explores how various archival collections influence assumptions about experience, and voices an 
imperative to explore and acknowledge these silences as they occur. Trouillot defines archival 
silences as the lack of primary sources; limited archival collections; myopic academic research; 
and popular narratives that prioritize select themes, voices, or events over others. Attention to the 
problem of silences within history is imperative for the exploration of immigration histories 
because populations who are viewed as powerless—including refugee populations—often find 
themselves silenced in history. Thanks to his methodological example, this study expands the 
narrative scope to include Shanghai Jewish experiences before their transport across the United 
States.  
  When we examine intersecting, transnational communities in relationship to each other 
and within the context of their own environments, these communities’ roles and resources 
emerge with more complexity and nuance than if studied in isolation. To confront limited 
primary sources and archival collections that so often emerge alongside these historical inquiries, 
we must also transcend boundaries around ports, wars, and nations. The framework I used to 
connect together the Shanghai and American Jewish communities does not, I hope, default 
exclusively to fracturing shared identities or seeking patterns in all their interactions. Rather, the 
                                                 
24 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: 
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research suggests individuals and groups both splintered and came together in shifting, ebbing 
waves based on external context and internal effort. By studying the motion of these ever-
changing tides as they moved across oceans, decades, and groups, we may challenge tendencies 
to simplify refugee experiences or sidestep contradictory data. And by following the train tracks 
of fewer than one thousand Shanghai Jews as they crossed the United States, we may hear the 
deep reverberations of echoing larger narratives of immigration policy and transnational 
movements. 
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CHAPTER 2: DIVERSE DEMOGRAPHICS OF SHANGHAI JEWS, 1800S-1945 
  One of the most sparsely explored aspects of Shanghai Jewish wartime experiences is the 
demographic composition of the Jewish community prior to the European refugees’ arrival. Yet 
this exploration is essential to complicating and expanding refugees’ experiences, because it 
reveals the shifting relationships between members of the Jewish community based on origin, 
religious denomination, and socioeconomic status. Historians generally agree on the broad 
parameters of three phases of Jewish immigration into Shanghai: Baghdadi Jews following the 
First Opium War in the mid-nineteenth century; Russian Jews following the 1917 Russian 
Revolution; and European Jewish refugees in the late 1930s, fleeing from the rapidly expanding 
Third Reich.25 These transnational movements represented a wide array of experiences, thinly 
connected by a shared Jewish identity. 
 In this chapter, I explore the multiplicity of backgrounds, experiences, and choices of 
these three waves of immigration before and during World War II. By transcending the nation-
state borders of the United States and China, this section provides a brief glimpse into the 
international communication networks that individuals and institutions used to pass around and 
between nation-states, religions, ethnicities, languages, and socioeconomic strata. These 
networks also provide insight into the ways many refugees employed creative agency to navigate 
channels of paperwork and bureaucracy that, at any given time, impeded or guided their 
movements. 
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2.1  Sephardic Jews in the 1800s 
 
  Sephardic Jews were first drawn to Hong Kong in the 1840s under the protection of the 
Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, which ended the First Opium War and awarded special privileges to 
Westerners.26 The earliest official notation of Sephardic Jews in Shanghai comes from The 
Chinese Recorder in 1848, listing one unnamed Jewish resident, and “four Jewish assistants” 
who joined the roster the year after.27 In the decades that followed, new economic opportunities 
opened throughout East Asia, and the Sassoon family established businesses in Japan as early as 
1858.28 The Sephardic Jewish community in Shanghai expanded with the addition of several 
prominent families in the 1870s, namely the Kadoories and Hardoons.29 It was not until the 1895 
Treaty of Shimonoseki following the Sino-Japanese War that a sharp increase of Western 
presence came to Shanghai, and by 1899, the International Settlement had increased in size 
nearly tenfold from its 1854 configuration.30 Throughout their early history, this small group of 
Sephardic Shanghai Jews, numbering several hundred by the 1920s and over 1,000 by the 1930s, 
were nearly as diverse in composition as the city of Shanghai itself.1 While some emigrated 
directly from Baghdad—causing this community frequently to be referred to as “Baghdadi Jews” 
—others traced their routes through Bombay, Aleppo, and regions of Persia, or stitched together 
these ports of call by jumping city to city in search of expanding trade opportunities.31 
Many Sephardic Jews in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century experienced 
                                                 
26 Meyer, Rivers of Babylon, 1. 
27 Ibid., 12. Marcia Ristaino notes that the Sassoon family was present in Shanghai as early as 
1845; see Ristaino, Port of Last Resort, 21.  
28 Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis & Jews, 287-288, 47. 
29 Heppner, Shanghai Refuge, 38-39. Chiara Betta agrees with Meyer that the Sassoons expanded 
their influence from their residence in Hong Kong in the 1840s; see Chiara Betta, “From 
Orientals to Imagined Britons: Baghdadi Jews in Shanghai,” Modern Asian Studies 37.4 (2003), 
1001. Additionally, Heppner notes on p. 39 of Shanghai Refuge that these wealthy families came 
“by way of India,” a route that likely influenced a complicated yet important relationship to 
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isolation from larger centers of Jewish life, leading to the establishment of strong local kinship 
networks. 32 Rites of religious tradition, including Shabbat and Passover, were lavishly celebrated 
by the few families in Shanghai, and single Jewish men were invited to the homes of more 
established community members. Intermarriage and conversion were topics of intense scrutiny 
among this first generation of Sephardic Jews.33 Sephardic families were few in number but 
prestigious in their commercial connections, and marriage to a non-Jewish Chinese individual—
even if conversion were included—compromised class status.34 Yet even here, the lines between 
Jewish identity and Chinese ethnicity were blurred; during Passover, the Sephardic community 
of Shanghai readily invited Kaifeng Jews, who were seen as assimilated and more Chinese than 
“Orthodox” Jewish, into their homes. 35 This act was a break in etiquette, as non-Jewish 
Europeans in Shanghai purportedly avoided inviting Chinese residents into homes for social 
purposes.36  
Chinese residents of Shanghai often viewed the Jewish community as followers of a sect 
rather than a separate ethnicity. While youtai ren was the preferred nomenclature for Jews in the 
twenty-first century, Sephardic Jews often were described as jiao, or members of a philosophical 
belief system, rather than as an ethnicity or religion.37 Given the small number of Sephardic Jews 
                                                 
Britain expressed by Betta and Sarah Stein, “Protected Persons? The Baghdadi Jewish Diaspora, 
the British State, and the Persistence of Empire,” The American Historical Review 116, no. 1 
(Feb., 2011): 80-108. 
30 Meyer, From the Rivers, 3, 13. 
31 Betta, “From Orientals,” 1001, 1002. 
32 Ibid. See also Israel’s Messenger editor N.E.B. Ezra’s reflection on the “adoption” of single 
Jewish men by Sephardic families (Betta, 1002, footnote 6).  
33 Meyer, From the Rivers, 53.  
34 Ibid., 52.  
35 Ibid., 43-44. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Irene Eber, “Kaifeng Jews: The Sinification of Identity,” in The Jews of China: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives (Vol. 1), 28, 29. 
19 
in Shanghai at the time, it is hardly surprising that the nuances of background rarely emerged for 
their Chinese neighbors. 
The Sephardic community’s network experienced considerable growing pains with the 
arrival Russian (Ashkenazic) Jewish immigrants in the early years of the twentieth century. 
While not so large an influx of Jews as would arrive in Shanghai twenty years later, the 
Ashkenazic Jews from Russia nonetheless brought both political and religious issues to the 
forefront of discussions among preexisting Sephardic Shanghai Jews.  
2.2  Russian Jews in the 1910s and 1920s 
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War of 1918-1923 prompted over 4,500 
Jews to move to Shanghai via Harbin.38 Among these Ashkenazic Jews were Zionists, 
Communists, anti-Communists, religiously Orthodox, and stateless Jews of various socio-
economic means. This expansion of the Shanghai Jewish population in the 1910s and 1920s also 
sparked connections between the newly immigrated Jewish population and the Chinese 
Nationalists. Sun Yat-Sen publicly supported Jewish Zionism in Shanghai, albeit true to his 
diplomatic nature, never utilized the word “Zionism.”39 While Russian Jews and Chinese 
Nationalists forged these new partnerships, the Ashkenazic immigrants often experienced 
significant tensions with the established Sephardic Jewish community, including disagreements 
regarding orders of religious service and intermarriage between the two groups.  
Not all disagreements were based in religion and marriage; Sephardic and Russian Jews 
also were divided by citizenship privileges and the educational system. Select members of the 
                                                 
38 Heppner, Shanghai Refuge, 38-39. See also Jonathan Goldstein, Jewish Identities in East and 
Southeast Asia: New Perspectives on Modern Jewish History (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 
2012), 141. 
39 Scrapbook, June 4, 1920, box 1, folder 20, Jacob Friend Family Papers, 1915-2002, Collection 
116, Cuba Family Archives for Southern Jewish History at the Breman Museum. 
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Sephardic Jewish community, primarily those from the prominent Sassoon and Kadoorie 
families, possessed British citizenship despite never residing in Great Britain.40 Historian Chiara 
Betta argues that while not all Sephardic Jews were “wealthy, Anglicized, and thoroughly 
integrated into British social circles,” several prominent members of the Sephardic 
communities—especially those with trade ties to the Chinese and other international contacts—
employed their British affiliation in order to access political and economic protections and 
opportunities.41 Already outnumbered by the Ashkenazi Jews by the 1920s, many Sephardic 
Jews felt their diplomatic privileges could be jeopardized by the recent influx of Russian or 
stateless Jews. 
Another instance of friction among the Jewish community may be found in the 
educational system. Select Sephardic Jews were able to afford private tutors for their children, 
creating an educational inequity with Ashkenazic Jewish refugees, whose education often lapsed 
while fleeing the Bolshevik Revolution.42 When the Sephardic elite founded the Shanghai Jewish 
School (SJS) in 1904 and then expanded its services to children of lower socio-economic means 
in the years that followed, including those of Ashkenazic descent, a local educator criticized the 
SJS both for its British model and its accommodation of “an exceedingly poor class of 
children.”43 Linguistic divides also inhibited classroom instruction, as Arabic and English were 
                                                 
40 Meyer, From the Rivers, 48.  
41 Betta, “From Orientals,” 999, 1002, 1008. Sarah Stein agrees with Betta that Maisie Meyer 
overemphasizes Sephardic Jews’ desire for British protection, however Meyer’s archival work is 
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British affiliation; see Stein, “Protected Persons,” 89. 
42 Meyer, From the Rivers, 118-119. 
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socio-economic attendees, though her analysis suggests that attendees increased with the Jewish 
population surge in the late 1910s, as 1904 predates the large influx of Ashkenazic Jews by 
several years. Furthmore, Meyer identifies the criticizer of the SJS as “Miss Patterson, a teacher 
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common among the Sephardic Jewish teachers and students, but Ashkenazic Jewish immigrants 
were more familiar with Polish and Russian.44  
Finally, there existed an exceptional wealth gap between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews 
in Shanghai, even though some Russian Jews integrated themselves into Shanghai’s lucrative 
trade business.45 This translated into residential differences: Ashkenazic Jews largely occupied 
regions of the International Settlement, while Sephardic Jews often found themselves in 
wealthier sections of the French Concession. In 1937, when Hongkou was bombed, many 
Ashkenazic Jews’ homes were destroyed, resulting in what Shanghai resident Joe Hollzer 
described to a relative as “poverty [that has reduced the Russian Jews] almost [to] savagery.”46 
Even within the socioeconomic and educational divides that existed, some Jewish 
immigrants, like Jacob Friend, an amazing individual examined further below, navigated porous 
community boundaries. Friend used his mastery of English, German, Russian, Hebrew, and 
Yiddish to move between various Shanghai Jewish communities.47 While considered a Russian 
Ashkenazic Jew, Friend cut across the Ashkenazic-Sephardic divide and founded the Ashkenazi 
Jewish Communal Association; created a literary-musical reading group that served both 
Sephardic and Ashkenazic community members; produced articles in the North China Daily 
                                                 
in the Shanghai Public School,” which was a secular school in Shanghai (Meyer, From the 
Rivers, 121). For more information on the SPS, see Meyer, From the Rivers, 120-121. 
44 Irene Eber, Wartime Shanghai, 18-19. 
45 Ibid. 22. 
46 Ibid. See also letter from Joe Hollzer, Shanghai, to Judge H.A. Hollzer, December 25, 1937, 
Joint Distribution Committee Archives, as well as Joseph Fiszman, “The Quest for Status: Polish 
Jewish Refugees in Shanghai, 1941-1949,” The Polish Review 43, no. 4 (1998), 445. 
47 Application, Jacob Friend to the American Foreign Service Non-Immigrant Visa Service, 
September 4, 1936, box 1, folder 11, Jacob Friend Family Papers, 1915-2002, Collection 116, 
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News and the Baghdadi-founded Israel’s Messenger; and established an Ashkenazic Zionist 
organization.48 Friend illuminates the complex, fractured Jewish communities in Shanghai, while 
also exemplifying the ability of some immigrants to navigate and negotiate these networks 
despite the nation-state, socioeconomic, and linguistic divides. 
2.3 European Jews in the 1930s 
The close of the 1930s represented an era of increasing tension among Shanghai’s foreign 
communities. Japanese forces invaded and occupied Shanghai in 1937 at the dawn of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, even as British, American, and French had residents lost their dominance on 
the Shanghai Municipal Council to Chinese nationals.49 Jewish communities also found 
themselves waning in the interest, and therefore favor, of both the Japanese and Chinese 
government.50 
These localized politics reflected increased tensions within the larger international 
community: Germany’s Anschluss of Austria in 1938 preceded the invasion of Poland in 1939, 
ushering in a world conflict of staggering proportions.51 With the devastation of Kristallnacht 
                                                 
48 Application, Jacob Friend to the American Foreign Service Non-Immigrant Visa Service, 
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and rapidly expanding anti-Semitism throughout the Third Reich, Jewish refugees fled their 
homes in Europe in the face of rising uncertainty.52 Upwards of 20,000 Jewish refugees escaped 
to Shanghai from 1938 to 1943, flooding the port city with individuals who were often penniless 
and stateless.53 
2.4 Jewish Shanghai: Life During World War II 
World War II Shanghai is defined by the networks and strategies its residents developed 
to create order in the wartime chaos. Local and international Jewish aid agencies attempted to 
consolidate resources and strategies to host the diverse communities designated as under their 
purview, including several thousand European Holocaust refugees and long-term Shanghai 
residents.54  
Japanese forces entered Shanghai in 1937 following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident that 
launched the seven-year-long Second Sino-Japanese War.55 Upon capturing the port city of 
Shanghai, Japanese forces showed little interest in changing immigration, settlement, or ethnic 
registration policies for non-Chinese concessions within Shanghai. The largest influx of 
European Jewish refugees to Shanghai entered the port city ironically while under the occupation 
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of an Axis power, even while Allied powers gathered at the Evian Conference and decided they 
would not allow these European Jewish refugees to enter their borders.56 
This notably large wave of European Jewish immigrants during the 1930s is due almost 
entirely to Shanghai’s status as an open port: unlike nearly every other port of call, Shanghai did 
not require entry visas during the 1930s. Even with this bureaucratic boon, few welfare agencies 
in Europe recommended Shanghai due to its unsavory reputation for harsh conditions and radical 
cultural differences. Following Kirstallnacht, German Jews requesting emigration assistance 
from agencies including Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland were encouraged by the agencies 
to seek another avenue of escape, even though Shanghai did not require visas for entry.57 
Regardless, Shanghai became the chosen haven for approximately 20,000 European 
Jews. Several foreign diplomats in Europe—including Japanese diplomat Chiune Sugihara, 
stationed in Lithuania—wrote thousands of entry visas for Shanghai.58 Given that these visas 
were not required by Japanese or Chinese forces in Shanghai, it is more likely that the entry visas 
served as additional paperwork to assist Jews’ exit from Nazi-occupied regions and gain passage 
on international ships. Furthermore, Irene Eber and Avraham Altam argue it was not only Jews 
who considered Shanghai a solution for European Jews; Nazi Obersturmbannführer Adolph 
Eichmann also encouraged mass migration of Jews to Shanghai in 1939, going so far as to 
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approve a chartered ship to transport European Jews to China.59 Whether pushed or pulled, 
thousands of European Jews took advantage of this seemingly far-flung port, and their arrival 
drastically impacted the Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jewish communities that had resided there 
for decades.  
The Jewish immigrants who arrived in Shanghai during this final wave of immigration 
were the most diverse of any Jewish group yet. They originated from Germany, Poland, and 
Austria and ranged in socioeconomic class, although they often arrived with little to no liquid 
capital due to German border restrictions. Their educational levels, career skills, and languages 
varied widely. Even before setting foot in the port city of Shanghai, these immigrants arrived via 
a wide variety of bureaucratic channels and emigration loopholes.60 
The refugees placed significant strain on the existing Jewish communities both 
financially and spatially, with close to 2,500 relying entirely on international or local aid and 
nearly 6,000 requiring significant support.61 The financial situation became so dire that local 
Jewish authorities purportedly met with members of the Shanghai Municipal Council to discuss 
restricting the flood of incoming refugees.62 It was not until 1943, well after Japan’s attack on 
Pearl Harbor, the Tripartite Act, and Nazi pressure on Japanese authorities, that entry finally 
trickled to a stop.63  
The long-established Shanghai Jewish communities met the flood of refugees with both 
charity and a sense of anxiety. Individuals were well aware that the new Jewish community was 
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poor, lacked local connections, and could jeopardize the established community’s reputation as 
self-regulatory and non-intrusive. However, the reports of violent, anti-Semitic conditions from 
which these refugees fled preceded their arrival and sparked the establishment of several welfare 
organizations. At the beginning of the European Jewish influx, agencies, community leaders, and 
synagogues worked together to create spaces that encouraged a unified Jewish identity among 
both refugees and residents. Ernest Heppner asserts that the first refugees in 1938 “were warmly 
welcomed... and urged to forget their national origin, to consider themselves just as Jews.”64  
Several services and club membership were offered to Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews in 
Shanghai, including women’s benevolence societies, boy scout troops, burial services,  Zionist 
organizations, and youth groups. 65 The Shanghai Jewish Chronicle, assisted by Jacob Friend, 
published a series of Judische Kalednar (“Jewish Calendars”) between 1939 and 1945 with 
portions in Hebrew, Yiddish, and English, suggesting the authors sought to accommodate an 
increasingly transnational audience. 66 
Musical organizations and religious services also provided the opportunity for shared 
spaces of interaction: Jacob Friend coordinated the Jewish Choir under the auspices of Beth 
Aharon Synagogue, a Sephardic synagogue established in 1927. The donation-funded Jewish 
Choir was composed entirely of German (Ashkenazic) Jewish refugees, although anyone could 
join. 67 “A Lover of Choral Music” wrote to the editor of the North China Daily News in January 
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1945 to note that “it was for the benefit of those of the Jewish community who appreciate good 
choral religious services. What is Germany’s loss is Shanghai’s gain.”68  
Yet the Shanghai Jewish experience was not all shared chorales and worship services; 
just as many cultural opportunities aided Jews in building a unified identity, so too did 
differences in nation-state affiliation and class serve to drive wedges between them. While some 
members of the Shanghai Jewish community maintained affluence awarding such amenities as 
meals at cafés and private taxis, others endured the war in far less comfortable environments.69  
Ernest Heppner, a European refugee who disregarded the Hilfsverein’s advice not to go to 
Shanghai, described his move to Shanghai as “traumatic,” asserting that residents of the 
communal homes established by aid agencies (Heime) were “on the bottom of the social 
ladder.”70 Residents of the Heime reportedly went months without a sufficient meal, and many 
European Jews experienced intense, often suicidal anxiety due to their sharp downward 
socioeconomic turn in China.71 The International Committee of the Red Cross in June 1943 
noted that “the worst distress exists undoubtedly amongst the German-Jewish immigrants, of 
whom at least 6,000 are on the point of starvation and about 9,000 more are not far better off.”72  
The year 1943 produced an even deeper fissure in the Jewish community when Japan 
forced 20,000 Jews to relocate into the so-called Hongkou Ghetto. 73 While the Hongkou district 
of the International Settlement already housed thousands of Jews and featured centers of Jewish 
life, including the Ohel Moshe synagogue, conditions worsened with the influx of thousands 
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more into the already-cramped region of less than a square mile.74 Furthermore, not all Jews 
were required to move to the Hongkou Ghetto, creating a sharper divide among Shanghai Jews. 
The Japanese proclamation requiring the forced relocation did not provide a single reference to 
“Jews” or “ghetto,” but instead referred to “stateless persons” and a “designated area.”75 The vast 
majority of European Jews were considered stateless when they lost their citizenship due to Nazi 
Germany’s policies and were forced to move into the ghetto. 76 Several long-time Jewish 
residents, including Russian Jews, managed to live outside the ghetto due to loopholes in the 
carefully-worded proclamation.77 Ernest Heppner is clear in the divided experiences among the 
Jewish communities, noting that “none of the Jewish Shanghailanders or the Russian Jews were 
affected.”78 
The long-term Shanghai Jewish residents’ attempts to unify the diverse cultural and 
religious identities of European refugees were, at times, hindered by economic and national 
divides and exacerbated by Japanese policy. As will be seen, efforts by local and international 
welfare organizations established to aid the recently-arrived European refugees also served to 
both unify and fracture the diverse and fluid Jewish community.   
2.5 Intra-and Inter-Connections: Aid Organizations in Shanghai 
Beginning in the 1930s and lasting throughout World War II, the established Shanghai 
Jewish community faced a seemingly insurmountable task: the care of thousands of Jewish 
refugees whose entry altered the previously formed political, social, and economic network in 
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Shanghai. To accommodate this shift, welfare agencies were established or expanded and 
worked with local community leaders, Japanese officials, and international organizations to 
combat the starvation and disease that continually threatened the Shanghai Jewish community. 
These welfare agencies provided vital access to communication networks, identification cards, 
and bureaucratic assistance during and after World War II. 
For many European Jewish refugees, life in wartime Shanghai operated around these aid 
organizations, beginning with disembarkment from the transit ships, where they were met by 
Jewish welfare workers who ushered them into their temporary lodgings.79 Once registered by 
Jewish welfare organizations, European refugees with little to no money were resettled in Heime 
operated by various aid agencies. These welfare organizations also provided food kitchens, 
clothing, and carefully regulated stipends from donations received via neutral countries or 
through wealthy Shanghai Jewish residents, including the Sassoons and Hardoons.80 While the 
agencies attempted to join forces, their funding sources, organizational missions, and methods of 
aid often conflicted and overlapped. These aid agencies loosely fell into three groups: 
international governmental aid; local Jewish NGOs exclusive to Shanghai; and international 
Jewish NGOs with local offices in Shanghai.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross was one of the most active governmental 
aid organizations throughout the wartime era and provided numerous services, including food 
supplies and medical aid. The Red Cross’ public presence was eclipsed by other Jewish non-
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governmental welfare organizations by the early 1940s, save for their assistance in 
communications.81 Nonetheless, the Red Cross continued aspects of their work through local 
liaisons. Meyer Birman, Shanghai director of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), served 
as the officially appointed contact for the Red Cross when they found it too “difficult to 
communicate with the Jewish Refugees and Residents [sic] of the Designated Areas.”82 
Shanghai-based Jewish NGOs increased nearly as rapidly as the numbers of European 
Jewish refugees for whom they were established to serve. Wealthy, long-time residents of the 
Sephardic and Russian Jewish communities coordinated these local Jewish organizations, 
including the governing council, Judische Gemeinde.  Sir Victor Sassoon funded the 
International Committee for European Immigrants in China (I.C.) with administrative direction 
from Michael Speelman and Hungarian resident Paul Komor, the latter of whom served as lead 
organizer for the Committee of Assistance of European Refugees in Shanghai (C.A.R.E.).83 The 
difference in social positions was significant, however, between these wealthy Shanghai Jewish 
residents and the European Jewish refugees for whom they provided aid. 
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While the I.C. is perhaps best known for its assistance in procuring identification cards 
and navigating immigration policy, the organization also provided general aid for the refugees.84 
The top-down narrative that often accompanies the rhetoric of charitable work is evident in the 
case of Shanghai Jewish community. One I.C. fundraising poster (figure 1) depicts a male 
doctor, his sleeves rolled up to reveal his well-developed muscles while he pushes away the 
skeleton of death, holding up a naked female with hidden face, presumably too weak to stand on 
her own.85 Although the I.C.’s charity provided the refugees with housing, medical treatment, 
and food, the visual rhetoric of these posters suggests there also emerged a clearly articulated 
difference between Shanghai resident benefactors and European refugees who received this 
much-needed aid.  
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Figure 1:  Courtesy of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and Valerie Kromer 
 
  While I.C. and other local welfare organizations contributed significant funds and 
administrative assistance to the refugees, two internationally-recognized aid organizations 
dominated the welfare program in Shanghai: American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
(JDC) and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). These two organizations were essential in 
the survival of thousands of Jews during World War II, as well as instrumental in their 
emigration efforts in the latter half of the 1940s. As will be seen in the following chapters, their 
overlapping missions to aid all Jews, regardless of nationality or religious affiliation, were not 
always cordially coordinated. Rather, their shared territory in Shanghai emblazoned preexisting, 
transnational tensions between the two groups’ international administrations.  
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The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, founded in 1881 to assist Jews fleeing pogroms in 
Poland and Russia, opened an office in China in 1917.86 Meyer Birman, a Russian Jew and long-
time Shanghai resident, served as director of the HIAS office for the span of World War II. He 
frequently derided the JDC for its purported lack of attention to the Shanghai Jews’ plight, 
charging that despite their “colossal resources,” the JDC refused relief loans to the Shanghai 
Jews, causing “thousand and thousand [sic] of refugees [to be] doomed for starvation.”87  
The Joint Distribution Committee was known throughout the international Jewish 
community well before the outbreak of World War II. Between its inception in 1914 and a post-
World War II report in 1953, the JDC—or, self-referentially, the “Jewish Red Cross”—spent 
$500,000,000 on relief efforts, including assistance in immigration, food and medicine, and 
community building in Asia, South America, Europe, and Australia.88 During World War II, the 
JDC largely focused its efforts on the plight of Jewish refugees in Europe rather than in Asia, 
although they did provide aid overlooked by Birman.89  
The JDC’s first representative in Shanghai, Laura Margolis, exhibited the ability of 
individuals to navigate complex community networks. Margolis, an Austrian-Hungarian-Russian 
Jew born in Turkey in 1903, was sent to Shanghai in 1941 following the completion of her relief 
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efforts in Havana, Cuba, by request of the U.S. State Department, with whom the JDC worked 
closely.90 While the JDC had been sending funds to support “a Jewish committee of local leaders 
[in Shanghai],” the Shanghai consulate was swamped and disorganized. The JDC charged 
Margolis to focus on assisting the consulate, but instead, she expanded her duties to coordinate 
funding and soup kitchens even though she “wasn’t supposed to get mixed up [with local refugee 
requests].” Margolis asserted that she “had to get to know the Jewish community structure of 
local residents,” and her success was largely due to her knowledge and subsequent navigation of 
the complicated communication networks in Shanghai that connected refugees, residents, and 
Japanese authorities. 
When Allied funds trickled to a halt because Japan restricted Margolis from receiving aid 
from Allied nations or “enemy aliens,” Margolis learned through her sources that Japanese 
Imperial Navy Captain Koreshige Inuzuka “liked Jews.”91 She befriended Inuzuka at a dinner 
party and worked with the Japanese administrator to establish soup kitchens for thousands of 
Jewish refugees.92 She continued her work for nearly a year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
when local Japanese officials received orders to intern all Allied representatives. She eventually 
returned to the U.S. during a prisoner of war exchange in 1944, where she continued on to 
Barcelona to assist the Jewish community through the end of the war.  
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In 1945, a wave of welfare organizations swept into Shanghai to aid members of Jewish 
and non-Jewish communities who wished to leave. The International Refugee Organization 
(IRO), HIAS-HICEM, the United Service for New Americans, and the AJJDC worked with 
immigration agencies from Canada, Australia, the United States, and Argentina to coordinate the 
mass exit. Those with valid Allied passports found the exit easiest to manage, followed by 
stateless Jews who were born in Germany.93 The latter group received benefit from President 
Truman’s December 1945 directive to assign two-thirds of all displaced person (DP) quotas to 
German-born individuals in his efforts to accommodate these persons. The challenge, however, 
came with those who were born in Poland, Austria, and Russia: the Shanghai Jewish refugees 
shared their small quota with Jewish refugees in Europe, so that the meager 1,413 visas per year 
were quickly assigned to those still living in Europe’s displaced persons née concentration 
camps. In a tweak of terminology, Jews in Shanghai were not considered DPs; as will be seen, 
this proved disastrous for many Jewish refugees in China and was responsible for the series of 
sealed trains in 1949. 
This nation-based quota system served to further divided Jewish communities already 
fractured by the spatial and socioeconomic layout of wartime Shanghai. Membership in a 
national or religious movement often proved most advantageous to securing visas. Shanghai 
Jews who previously were members of famous yeshivas in Europe, including Mir and Lubavitch, 
capitalized on their prestigious reputation among politically well-placed Americans and 
Europeans who pushed their visa applications to the top of the pile.94 This exit of 400 Orthodox 
Polish Jews—many of whom chose the United States as their final destination—maxed the non-
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DP visas assigned to Polish Jews. The remaining non-“elite” Polish Jews were required to wait 
up to several years for departure.95  
While the local and international welfare agencies provided essential resources and 
bureaucratic assistance for emigrating European Jewish refugees, they were not the sole 
determinants in refugees’ destinations. Rather, individuals and institutions formed an 
interdependent network of agency. Through their communication networks, Shanghai Jewish 
refugees discovered that a JDC representative—Laura Margolis—had arrived in Shanghai, and 
against the policy of the JDC and U.S. consulate, they visited her hotel room to plead their 
case.96 Thanks to their initiative, Margolis issued the JDC an “ultimatum” for additional 
personnel and expanded her role to coordinate foundational aid for the refugees, and, as was 
seen, procured resources and funds through her relationship with Japanese and local officials.97  
Some of most compelling examples of refugees creatively tapping into institutional and 
kinship networks may be found in their efforts to transcend ports and borders. Before, during, 
and after the war, members of the Jewish community wrote dozens of letters requesting 
admittance into countries perceived as sanctuaries. Ernest Heppner met with several Jewish aid 
representatives and friends to determine a way to escape Europe, and managed to acquire the 
paperwork and finances to allow his and his mother’s transportation to Shanghai.98 Likewise, 
Meyer Birman, director of HIAS-Shanghai, wrote to friends in Australia, the United States, and 
Canada at the close of World War II, pleading for admittance based on his work with the 
Shanghai Jewish community and his personal connections with members of government.99 
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This deliberate, dynamic navigation of immigration channels is perhaps best represented 
by Jacob Friend. After numerous requests for a travel visa, Friend moved to the Philippines in 
1941-1942 to work with a company, leaving his daughter and wife in Shanghai.100 While in 
Manila, prior to Pearl Harbor, Friend requested several letters of recommendation to various 
international offices for immigration, most notably the United States.101 Among those 
recommendation letters, Friend secured affidavits attesting to family relations in the United 
States; character reports from Chief Rabbi of Shanghai, M. Ashkenazi and New York’s Rabbi 
Abraham Edelman; and notarized records of financial savings amounting to $20,000.102 He 
finally managed to procure a visa to the United States by obtaining a rabbi’s permit in 1947, 
allowing his daughter to accompany him but requiring him to leave behind his wife, Frieda, in 
Shanghai.103 In 1955 his wife immigrated to the United States via Israel after nearly a decade of 
waiting for admittance to the U.S.104  
2.6  Conclusion 
While secondary sources usually close their narratives well before the arrangement of 
immigration trains, planes, and steamships to accommodate these final remnants of the Shanghai 
Jewish community, the experiences of this small group are foundational to understanding how 
Shanghai Jewish refugees and American Jewish communities forged an interdependent 
relationship. 
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  Far from a monolithic group, Shanghai Jews spoke different languages, identified as 
different nationalities, held widely variant positions in socioeconomic strata, and found 
themselves arriving in Shanghai with diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural baggage. This diverse 
community depended on communication networks to inform their actions, and they navigated 
these local and international to secure assistance and resources. Often stateless, these Shanghai 
Jews were, perhaps, more truly global citizens.  
International organizations, individuals, and governments managed to rescue nearly 
20,000 Jews from Shanghai in the years following World War II. By 1948, over 5,000 Jews still 
awaited emigration from Shanghai. While welfare organizations and shared cultural and religious 
spaces often created a sense of unity among the Shanghai Jews, the post-World War II rush to 
emigrate from Shanghai and the stubbornly restrictive United States immigration policies only 
served to widen the cracks between these complex individuals. As the uncertainty of the Chinese 
Civil War marched closer to Shanghai in 1948, the United States Congress remained steadfastly 
resolute in its nation-based immigration policy. An increased sense of urgency rippled through 
Shanghai Jews and Jewish welfare organizations, setting off a series of departures that brought 
the international drama to the American stage.  
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CHAPTER 3: POST-WAR UNCERTAINTIES, 1945-1949 
The formal conclusion of World War II took place September 2, 1945, on board the USS 
Missouri in Tokyo Bay.105 This historic moment marked a bookend in the military narrative, but 
for millions of refugees around the world, September 2 represented no more than a hopeful 
unknown along an incomplete timeline running through one of history’s most dynamic diasporic 
eras. Refugees, stateless individuals, and displaced persons were already caught in a cycle of 
transnational movement, and Victory over Japan Day marked neither an end nor a beginning to 
their journeys. 
 Following World War II, thousands of Shanghai Jews built their case for immigration to 
the United States, Canada, and Australia. Several factors combined to hinder the refugees’ 
immigration to their country of choice, however. This chapter will review the role of U.S. 
immigration policy and the Chinese Civil War in creating a vise in which many Shanghai Jews 
found themselves trapped, followed by an investigation into the ways welfare institutions and 
individual refugees crafted and negotiated the logistics of emigration from Shanghai. The chapter 
concludes with the embarkment of nearly 500 Shanghai Jews on a sealed train across the United 
States in 1949. This passage provided the opportunity for members of American Jewish 
communities to address local immigration policy and community responsibility anxieties, with a 
goal of ameliorating their own fundraising and political situations while publicly supporting the 
refugees. To explore the interconnections between these American and Shanghai Jewish 
communities, however, we must first examine the political, social, and institutional environments 
that brought these two communities face to face.  
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3.1 Shanghai Jews and the Immigration Gamble: 1945-1948 
Shanghai Jews provided a vital link between China, the United States, and Palestine-
Israel in the late 1940s and, for a few brief months in 1949, they became the face of immigration 
policy and global migration among American Jewish communities. A narrow number of 
countries offered Shanghai Jews the opportunity for post-war emigration, with Canada, 
Australia, and, by 1948, the newly-formed state of Israel being the most feasible.106  Several 
Zionist organizations had been established in Shanghai prior to the end of World War II, yet 
many Jewish residents and refugees preferred immigration to the United States over Palestine. In 
February 1949, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) reported that over 2,000 Shanghai Jews 
turned down visas to Israel in hopes of immigration to the United States or Australia.107 
The post-World War II preference for the United States is hardly surprising, though 
rarely studied. Due to a large influx of Jewish immigration to the United States in the nineteenth-
century, the nation offered the opportunity to join existing kinship networks, tap into established 
economic institutions, and embrace a lifestyle that suggested growth, freedom, and protection.108 
While Canada offered many of these opportunities, its Jewish population was only a small 
percentage of the United States’ Jewish population; Australia also featured established, yet far 
more modest, Jewish communities. Israel, while accepting the largest quota of Jewish 
immigrants, by 1948 already had earned the reputation for harsh living conditions, hostile 
                                                 
106 Survey of Present Conditions and Outlooks for Jewish Emigration in the Most Important 
Immigration Countries, HIAS-JCA Emigration Association (HICEM), 1938, MKM 15.148, Yivo 
Institute for Jewish Research.  
107 Letter from Mr. J. Rice to Mr. M. Beckelman, Re: Analysis of our present relationship with 
IRO, February 11, 1949, 1933-1944 New York Collection: Selected Documents, 460255, Joint 
Distribution Committee Archives. 
108 Jonathan Sarna, American Judaism: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 9-
12.  
41 
neighboring countries, and a nation whose government, infrastructure, and economy operated 
with only a few months’ experience under its belt.109 While 2,767 Jews opted for immigration to 
Israel by the close of 1948, the preference for the United States was so high that the JDC 
expressed increasing concern about the Shanghai Jewish community refusing entry visas to the 
newly-established state. As the Chinese Civil War drew nearer to the port city of Shanghai, 
several thousand Jewish residents and refugees gambled with their futures in hopes of securing 
immigration to the United States. Thanks to American nativist pressures and a stubbornly 
restrictive immigration policy, however, many kept rolling snake eyes. 
3.2 A Bureaucratic Vise: U.S. Immigration Policy, 1920s-1940s 
The U.S. bureaucratic bottleneck faced by many hopeful Shanghai Jewish immigrants to 
the United States before, during, and after World War II was not a recent development. 
Isolationist politicians and nativist communities shaped the bottleneck’s contours through 
decades of increasingly restrictive policies. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which barred 
Chinese labor from immigration to the U.S., is emblematic of the methods by which many 
American communities ideologically linked Chinese stereotypes with restrictive immigration 
policy. While Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, the restrictive Chinese 
immigration policy remained embedded within public perception by the time of the Shanghai 
Jewish sealed trains.110 The Exclusion Act directly connected socioeconomic status and an 
ethno-national hierarchy with immigration policy. 111 Many historians highlight the racial 
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components of the Act, however the exclusionary policy also reflected intersectional 
discrimination based on class and gender. The Act excluded Chinese laborers without exception 
during its first ten years, while Congress declared Chinese academics and merchants 
“exempt.”112  
American proponents of restrictive immigration policy did not only target Chinese 
laborers, however. Since well before the turn of the century, non-Western immigrants to the 
United States often served as “scapegoats for the nation’s insecurity.”113 During and after World 
War II, U.S. Congress continued to uphold the nation-based immigration policy established by 
the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924. Riding the coattails of the Immigration Act of 1921, 
itself born of post-World War I isolationist policy and decades of conservative calls for literacy-
based immigration exams, the Immigration Act of 1924 hardened nation-state boundaries and 
severely restricted immigration. For every nation outside the Americas, this policy dictated that 
the United States annually admit only 2% of that nation’s population already living within the 
United States. These national quota numbers were based on the 1890 U.S. census, which 
reflected a higher percentage of Western European immigrants. The 1924 Act throttled 
immigration from countries including Poland and Russia, and just twenty-five years later, 
prevented many Shanghai Jews from finding refuge in America.  
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As restrictive as the nation-based quotas appear, conservative pressures to define 
socioeconomic status made their execution even more restrictive. In 1930, President Hoover 
increased the restrictive nature of the 1924 Act’s “likely to be a public charge” (LPC) policy, 
purportedly in order to decrease unemployment by decreasing immigration rates during the Great 
Depression.114 Because the LPC policy required numerous stipulations for admittance, many of 
the already-restrictive 1924 immigration quotas remained unfilled. The Roosevelt Administration 
eventually eased the LPC requirements in 1938, but conservative and nativist pressures did not 
relent, and Congress debated immigration policy with renewed vigor amidst the rise of Nazi 
Germany and its anti-Semitic ideology. The Evian Conference of 1938, during which U.S. 
officials expressed their refusal to lift the nation-based quotas for Jews attempting to escape 
Nazi-occupied Europe, codified the Roosevelt Administration’s determination to maintain the 
strict policy of 1924.115 The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization’s LPC requirements of 
economic and “moral” assets further stymied immigration efforts of European Jews, whose 
property and financial assets were confiscated by the Third Reich.116 
Nativist support for these restrictive immigration laws was not left unchecked, however. 
A notable example is the 1939 Wagner-Rogers Bill, a bipartisan plan scripted by Senator Robert 
Wagner (D-NY) and Representative Edith Rogers (R-MA) to temporarily lift U.S. quota 
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restrictions in order to rescue 20,000 Jewish children from Nazi-occupied regions.117 
Unsupported by the Roosevelt Administration, however, the bill died in committee. Laura 
Delano Doughteling, wife of the U.S. Commissioner of Immigration and cousin to President 
Roosevelt, reportedly quipped of the Wagner-Rogers bill: “20,000 charming children would all 
too soon grow into 20,000 ugly adults.”118 Not all communities and institutions in the United 
States reflected these nativist sentiments, however, and their efforts led to the rescue of 
thousands of Shanghai Jews. 
3.3 Jewish Emigration Agencies in Post-War Shanghai   
Even before the end of the war, Allied forces began preparations for what would become 
one of the largest transnational migrations in history. In 1943, the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was established and, with considerable international 
assistance, qualified approximately six million as “displaced persons” (DPs) in the months 
following V-E Day.119 The applications of those who qualified as DPs were prioritized within the 
nation-based quotas, and with hundreds of thousands competing for only a few thousand—and in 
many cases, a few hundred—immigration visas to the United States, this designation was of vital 
importance to securing passage to America. Yet by 1946, there still remained 1.2 million DPs 
caught in a bureaucratic web that Hannah Arendt deemed “essentially political.”120  
In the post-war years, several international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations stepped in to assist refugees stranded in their wartime bunkers. For Shanghai Jews, 
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three organizations dominated the immigration shuffle: the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 
(HIAS), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO), which had overtaken many of UNRRA’s operations by 1948. For 
immigrants who secured visas to the United States, the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) worked 
closely with the United Service for New Americans (USNA) and local federations to settle newly 
immigrated Jews throughout America, whose names and arrival information they secured 
through a vast logistical labyrinth composed of IRO, JDC, HIAS, and other NGO and 
governmental sources.121 Once the USNA received information regarding the new immigrants, 
whom they often referred to as “units” to maintain familial connections, the USNA requested 
Jewish federations throughout the United States to oversee the work, housing, and social 
logistics of these immigrants’ settlement.122 In an attempt to avoid one city receiving too many 
“units” at a time, the USNA negotiated with local federations to establish each city’s quota of 
immigrants based on an annual and monthly allotment. While the UJA and USNA provided vital 
resources and networks for immigrants within the United States, HIAS, JDC, and IRO provided 
the most direct connections between hopeful Shanghai Jewish immigrants and American policy 
makers. 
HIAS, JDC, and IRO’s efforts to assist Shanghai Jews were severely limited by the 
Displaced Persons Act of 1948. At first glance, the U.S. Displaced Persons Act of 1948 offered 
an expansive opportunity for Jews displaced by the Holocaust through its provision of 200,000 
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immigration visas to any “displaced person or refugee.”123 The Act, however, narrowed this 
eligibility to include only those who lived in Germany and Austria between September 1939 and 
December 1945, as well as for those who lived in Germany or Austria as of January 1948. This 
excluded many Jews who escaped Nazi-occupied Germany and Austria, and those who fled to 
Shanghai before September 1939 and remained there in 1948—as thousands did—were 
ineligible for DP designation. The 1948 Displaced Persons designation prioritized DPs born in 
Germany and Austria, thereby precluding those of Eastern European and North African 
descent.124 
The Act further underscored nation-state divisions among the Shanghai Jewish 
community by rendering ineligible thousands of Polish, Russian, and Lithuanian Jews.125 As 
observed by one Shanghai Jew, “in 1947/1948, this dream [to immigrate to the United States] 
came true for about 7,000 of our fellow-sufferers… in fact, the German quota-group could 
proceed to the States without the [help] of the Organizations, while nothing [emphasis added] 
was done for the Shanghai-stranded DP group.”126 Those ineligible for DP-status were required 
either to find creative solutions within their communication networks, as in the case of the 400 
Polish rabbis and rabbinical students, or be forced to wait years to immigrate, as in the case of 
the Shanghai Jews aboard the sealed trains.127 
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The DP Act’s discriminatory measures enraged many reporters covering the post-World 
War II immigration crisis in Jewish newspapers, and The Council News ran an article featuring a 
statement by the Shanghai-based “Citizens Committee” that paralleled the 1948 Act with Adolph 
Hitler’s philosophy.128 The Jewish community was not alone in criticizing the Act. U.S. 
President Harry S. Truman vocally opposed the measures, although he “reluctantly” signed it as 
a stop-gap, stating, “this bill excludes Jewish displaced persons (and) [sic] also excludes many… 
of the Catholic faith… There is no explanation for Congress’s choosing the 1945 date except 
upon the abhorrent ground of intolerance.”129 Truman estimated that ninety percent of Jews were 
rendered ineligible based on the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. 
The establishment of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948, provided an alternative option 
for Jews refused entry to the United States. The establishment of Israel, however, did not provide 
a simple solution to the stranded Shanghai Jews. As previously noted, many refugees within the 
Shanghai Jewish community preferred the opportunities and networks of the United States to the 
harsh conditions of Israel. To add to the pressure of the situation, those who escaped to Israel as 
an interim stop feared this move might delay or disqualify them from future immigration to the 
United States. Karl Redisch, president of the Shanghai-based Council of European Refugee 
Organizations, made it clear that his journey’s desired end lay in America, not Palestine: 
“Shanghai was but a milestone on our way to the United States, where we desired to rejoin our 
families.” 130 Adolph Glassgold, the JDC’s representative in Shanghai, expressed the challenges 
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he faced convincing the refugees to accept visas to Israel, noting that “so far as the DP 
Community is concerned, the majority still cling feverishly, desperately to the hope of a revised 
DP bill, which would admit them, so they believe, within the next few months to the United 
States.”131 
Despite the restrictive situations, many Shanghai Jews played a large role in determining 
their future destinations through their persistent refusal to apply for visas to Israel. Their decision 
to wait required Jewish welfare institutions to maintain offices in Shanghai longer than expected, 
and with the looming cloud of the Chinese Civil War, prompted the JDC, IRO, and HIAS to 
develop a series of last-minute extractions in the spring of 1949.   
3.4 The Chinese Civil War 
Prior to World War II, British, French, and Japanese individuals and governments were 
more influential in China than the United States, the latter of whom were composed largely of 
missionaries, select commodity traders, and isolated diplomats.132 The “Rape of Nanking” drew 
the attention of U.S. media outlets and the public to China in December 1937.133 Thanks to the 
eyewitness reports of American news correspondents who chose to remain in Nanking during the 
attack, the New York Times, Chicago Daily News, and Washington Post published gory details of 
“mass executions… of streets scattered with the dead bodies of women, elderly men, and 
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children.”134 Media served a fundamental role in bringing China into clearer focus for 1940s-era 
Americans, and the lens was shaded with the rhetoric of violence and Japanese aggression. These 
themes of violence and aggression appeared again in American newspapers with the increase of 
hostilities during the Chinese Civil War a decade later, and served as foundational context for the 
ways in which American Jewish communities framed the experiences of Shanghai Jews.     
Contentions between the Nationalist and Communist forces in China had two decades of 
history before the Chinese Civil War of 1945-1949.135 The Chinese Civil War of the 1940s, often 
framed by international observers as a conflict between two massive personalities—Nationalist 
China’s (KMT) Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Mao Zedong— 
involved decades of social, economic, and geographic underpinnings and millions of individuals 
ranging from rural peasants to Beijing’s intelligentsia. Tensions between the KMT and CCP, 
generated during their concurrent battles with northern warlords during the 1920s and 1940s, 
ebbed and flowed throughout the interwar period and into World War II; as S.C.M. Paine notes, 
the conflict was “a civil war within a regional war within a global war.”136 Even during Japanese 
occupation, the CCP continued to amass soldiers and arms, and the KMT successfully petitioned 
the United States for financial aid.137 With the surrender of Japan at the September 1945 signing 
of the Instrument of Surrender, the KMT and CCP shifted gears and again prioritized their 
aggressions toward each other.  
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Between 1946 and 1948, favorable tides turned swiftly from the KMT to the CCP. By the 
early months of 1948, Mao and his CCP forces conquered Manchuria and were headed toward 
Nanjing and Shanghai.138 As the conflict neared Shanghai, the United States administration and 
media took closer notice. Shanghai was situated at the center of international media attention. As 
China’s most modern port, with an established history of British and French traders and as the 
haven for thousands of still-stranded Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews, Shanghai dominated 
American headlines that reported the Chinese Civil War. 
The post-World War II United States, under President Truman’s administration, favored 
the KMT for reasons ranging from ideological rejection of Communism to protection of 
American interests supported by KMT’s socioeconomic elite.139 Following the Japanese invasion 
of China in 1937, the United States communicated almost exclusively with the KMT; there were 
few formal exchanges between the United States government and the CCP from 1937 to 1944, 
and the post-war communication hardly flourished.140  
KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek on the other hand, like his predecessor Sun Yat-sen, 
engaged the international community and sought and received substantial aid from the United 
States. Given that Chiang Kai-shek worked hard to project himself as Sun Yat-sen’s successor, 
he also inherited Sun’s support for the Jewish community in Shanghai.141 While it may not be 
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assumed that China’s general population was aware of plans to settle thousands of Jews in 
southwest China, plans by Maurice William and Jakob Berglas plans were presented and briefly 
supported by the KMT, further aligning many Jews’ support with the KMT.142  
As the CCP forces neared the international port of Shanghai, Mao’s anti-imperialist 
rhetoric collided with some U.S.-based media outlets’ anti-Communist agendas, unleashing a 
flood of headlines that raised alarm among the international Jewish community.143 By the fall of 
1948, Jewish refugees, residents, and welfare organizations significantly increased their efforts to 
emigrate the remaining 5,000 Shanghai Jews. 
Media coverage of the CCP’s march toward Shanghai attracted the attention of powerful 
American politicians who saw the opportunity to place the plight of Shanghai Jews within the 
context of U.S. immigration policy. The grandson of German Jewish immigrants, New York 
Representative Emanuel Celler took special note of the situation.144 In April 1948, 
Representative Celler wrote to the JDC to request information about the Shanghai Jewish 
community, adding, “this information is necessary to me as a basis for legislation concerning 
these refugees, and should cover the number of refugees, what countries they came from, when 
they left the countries of their origin, and how long they have been in Shanghai.”145 While the 
JDC’s response to Emanuel Celler is lost, its contents must have proven persuasive to the New 
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York Democrat. He proceeded to draft a house bill to argue for inclusion of Shanghai refugees in 
the Displaced Persons quota, and his proposed bill later contributed the New York-based 
Aufbau’s political interpretation of the Shanghai Jewish refugees. 
3.5 Organizational Love Triangle: JDC, HIAS, and IRO 
 
 The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society (HIAS), and International Refugee Organization (IRO) coordinated the majority of the 
Shanghai Jews’ evacuation at the close of the 1940s, with the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) 
serving as a fundraising institution and the United Service for New Americans (USNA) 
coordinating the settlement of Shanghai Jewish refugees with local U.S. Jewish federations.146 
The situation often became heated with so many proverbial cooks in the kitchen, and the 
Shanghai Jewish evacuation reveals the competition between the JDC and HIAS for institutional 
affiliations and donation funds.  
  The JDC’s internationally-recognized reputation as the dominant Jewish welfare society, 
its established connections with the U.S. State Department, and its considerably larger funding 
sources all contributed to situate the JDC at the crossroads of the Shanghai Jewish relief efforts, 
often to the disadvantage of the HIAS. Even though JDC and HIAS joined administrative forces 
on campaigns such as the Shanghai Jewish evacuation, institutional tensions had rippled from the 
upper administrative echelon down to the local field reporters during and after World War II.147 
One such HIAS representative expressed frustration about the JDC in 1948, reporting that the 
“JDC does not make many friends in Paris. They ride around in big automobiles with ‘JDC New 
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York’ marked all over them. It has gotten to a point where when you leave a car belonging to an 
American they cut your tires.”148    
  JDC and HIAS operated almost entirely on individual and non-governmental 
contributions, and the competition for contributions became increasingly fierce post-World War 
II. The United Jewish Appeal (UJA), in particular, disseminated its funds to several beneficiaries 
and was a key financial supporter of the JDC. In 1949, the UJA pledged 45% of its initial 
$100,000,000 fundraising income to the JDC; when the UJA fell short of its 1949 campaign 
goals, however, and the JDC felt the financial bite.149 The JDC publicly reported a “sharp” 
downward trend in fundraising contributions, heightening tensions with institutions like HIAS 
whose missions—and potential funders—overlapped considerably.150  
   In order to remain fiscally viable and retain support of institutions like the UJA, each 
institution needed to convince current and potential contributors that its organization was the 
most capable institution to channel individual donations to their intended cause. This proof could 
take the form of alliances with powerful partners, including governmental agencies like the 
International Refugee Organization.  
  The JDC and HIAS’s competition for affiliation with the IRO often centered around the 
arrangement of Jewish refugee immigration to Israel.151 The JDC, which possessed an 
established network of governmental contacts as exhibited by Laura Margolis’ work with the 
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U.S. consulate in Shanghai, was the primary Jewish welfare organizational partner of the IRO. 
HIAS, however, wished to enter into the arrangement. Previous attempts to merge immigration 
programs met with only partial success throughout the 1940s. HIAS and JDC engaged in 
ongoing negotiations to divide rescue efforts with the JDC throughout the 1940s, but by the 
1948, HIAS reported that JDC would “not sit down with our [people] and work out a 
procedure.”152 While HIAS, USNA, and the immigration branch of the JDC would eventually 
merge to form HIAS-HICEM in 1954, tensions between the individual institutions are vividly 
described in their competition for press attention regarding the Shanghai Jewish transports, as 
will be seen. 
3.6 The Shanghai Jewish Refugee Trains 
 As Representative Celler argued on behalf of the Shanghai Jewish refugees in January 
and February of 1949, the JDC, HIAS, and IRO worked to organize seven flights—four to Israel, 
one to Australia, and one to England—and five steamships to evacuate 1,470 Jews from 
Shanghai.153 Three factors determined the method of transport: speed of travel, number of 
passengers, and perhaps most contentiously, cost of transport. While the JDC often put forth the 
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initial loan for passage and received reimbursement from the IRO, there also is indication that 
the passengers themselves directly refunded the JDC.154 Although air travel was the fastest and 
most comfortable of all transportation methods, chartered airplanes carried between eight and 52 
passengers each, whereas steamships accommodated upwards of 430 passengers. Furthermore, 
air flight was cost-prohibitive. The IRO refunded the JDC $15,600 for the transport of 52 
Shanghai Jews via plane. At a rate of $300 per person, it is likely this was only partial 
reimbursement for one leg of travel.155 
  Transportation around South America or South Africa via steamship took considerably 
longer to complete, with the latter trip lasting approximately six weeks. 156 Furthermore, the 
American President Lines steamship company with whom the JDC coordinated transport often 
were unable to secure a chartered vessel exclusively for Shanghai Jews bound for Israel.157 The 
JDC and IRO therefore investigated a third option: purchasing berths on regularly-scheduled 
trans-Pacific ships, followed by a transcontinental train across the United States. The Shanghai 
Jews would then board the American Explore Lines steamship from New York to eventually 
disembark in Haifa, Israel.158 Cost of transport amounted to approximately $550 per person, 
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$351.79 of which the IRO reimbursed to the JDC, and included a 3rd class ship berth, a coach 
seat on the transcontinental sealed train, and $28.81 worth of meals.159 The steamship companies 
convinced the JDC of this third option, stating that sealed trains were considered a potentially 
faster and “more interesting” form of transport than the steamship-only method of transportation, 
and far less expensive than a chartered vessel.160  
  While the JDC succeeded in arranging the transhemispheric travel, they encountered 
considerable difficulty in persuading Shanghai Jewish refugees to agree to transport via the 
sealed refugee trains across the United States. The passengers were required to remain on the 
train and under the “surveillance of railroad guards,” and the Southern Pacific Transportation 
Company placed a $500 per passenger bond with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS).161 While it is unknown whether the Shanghai Jews were made fully aware of the 
nature of their transport, there did exist the potential that their exit from the United States would 
be considered a deportation, rendering them ineligible for future immigration to America. Once 
the JDC managed to secure assurance from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) that the passengers on the sealed train were not to be defined as “deported,” nearly 600 
Shanghai Jews joined the rosters for the SS General Gordon and SS General Meigs, bound for 
San Francisco in February and March 1949.162 
  One of the most challenging logistical obstacles for the JDC and IRO was the 
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determination of legal liability for the Shanghai Jews while they were in the United States. The 
JDC and IRO assured the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service that the Shanghai Jews 
would remain on the sealed train and under the surveillance of railroad guards throughout the 
entirety of their transit, and the Southern Pacific placed a $500 bond per passenger. To share the 
burden of liability among several parties, the IRO, JDC, and the USNA arranged the transport 
according to the Immigration Act of 1917, which placed responsibility on the transportation 
companies for the “detention and removal” of “[undocumented] aliens” should any of the 
refugees choose to flee the transport.163 This rendered the Shanghai Jewish refugees ineligible for 
a transit visa from Section 3(3) of the Immigration Act of 1924, which would have allowed them 
free travel across the United States, but proved considerably more challenging to arrange in 
terms of liability.164 While the IRO accepted public responsibility for the Shanghai Jewish 
refugees, numerous organizations behind the scenes—including the JDC, IRO, and steamship 
and rail companies—assumed partial financial and legal responsibility remittable to the INS 
should any Shanghai Jews attempt to jump train. 
  By the time the S.S. General Gordon set sail in early February 1949, the Shanghai Jewish 
transport was supported by four major welfare organizations. The IRO funded the majority of the 
refugees, the JDC advanced the payment and served as the project manager for the logistics of 
sea and train travel, and HIAS provided an interpreter for the refugees. Finally, the USNA 
supplied medical aid and on-board care packages for the refugees while in the United States, and 
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helped circulate information and schedules between the contributory institutions.165 
  On February 21, 1949, the S.S. General Gordon docked in San Francisco, carrying over 
500 Shanghai Jewish refugees.166 The United Service for New Americans (USNA) coordinated 
visitation from relatives in the United States, and the President Lines shipping company 
permitted U.S. relatives to visit their family members aboard the S.S. General Gordon in San 
Francisco from 12:00 to 10:00 p.m. on February 21, with a special dinner hosted by the shipping 
company that evening. To gain access to their family members aboard the S.S. General Gordon, 
U.S. relatives applied for passes from the President Lines, which were then validated by San 
Francisco’s U.S. Custom House.167 By noon on February 22, 1949, the Shanghai Jewish refugees 
were transferred from the S.S. General Gordon to the sealed train via a series of guarded busses, 
under supervision of U.S. transportation authorities.168 
  The passengers aboard the S.S. General Gordon were nearly as diverse as the larger 
Jewish community in Shanghai. Of the 467 Shanghai Jews who later boarded the sealed train, 
229 were European displaced persons and 238 were “Shanghai residents.”169 The latter group, 
defined by the JDC as “[o]ld time Jewish residents, mostly Russian and living principally in 
French Town,” presumably were Jews who resided in Shanghai prior to the influx of European 
refugees in 1938.170 The 467 Shanghai Jews who were to board the 20-car sealed diesel train 
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included 216 women, 230 men, and 34 children under the age of twelve.171  
  In addition to the 476 train-bound passengers, there were 135 “regular immigrants” on 
the S.S. General Gordon who were not required to board the sealed train. 172 Of these regular 
immigrants, 96 held U.S. visas and were approved for immigration as part of the nation-based 
immigration quota, and the 39 others continued to their next destinations, including Canada and 
nations in South America.173 The remaining 476 passengers were required to traverse the 
territory in sealed trains, with a $500 bond placed on each person’s head and a destination where 
many did not wish to permanently reside. As the refugees boarded the sealed train in San 
Francisco at the Third and Townsend Depot station, Israeli consul Reuven Dafni announced to 
them, “you are finally going home… never again will any power drive you from your homes.”174 
For the sealed refugees who witnessed nearly 100 of their fellow passengers depart to live in the 
United States —the nation which many Shanghai Jews waited years to lawfully enter--this 
announcement might have seemed tone-deaf.  
  Following the sealed transport’s departure from San Francisco, the train took a southerly 
route, stopping in Yuma and Tucson, Arizona; El Paso, Texas; Avondale, Louisiana; New 
Orleans, Louisiana; Montgomery, Alabama; Atlanta, Georgia; Washington, D.C.; and Jersey 
City.175 While the reasons for this southern route are not explicated in the archives, it may have 
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been a matter of comfort: the weather in southern states during February and March would be 
considerably more temperate than the climate of a northerly route.176                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7  Conclusion 
Once the Shanghai Jews boarded the sealed transport in San Francisco, the passage continued 
without any significant disturbances for the next several days, save for an incident in New 
Orleans where immigration officials allowed a woman and her husband to leave the train for 
admittance to a hospital.177 The Shanghai Jews also welcomed Julian Steinman as a new 
passenger, born during the transcontinental journey.178 
  The Shanghai Jewish passengers were joined by a doctor and two nurses, funded by 
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USNA, and an interpreter, funded by HIAS.179 The dining car did not serve pork to the refugees, 
however train personnel could consume non-kosher meats in the rear of the train.180 
Communities along the sealed train’s route contributed small gifts, mostly in the form of 
produce. The refugees purportedly were allowed to buy fruit in San Francisco, and local 
communities in El Paso and New Orleans donated fruit to the Shanghai Jewish residents. Yet 
“Atlanta’s welcome,” the Southern Israelite boasted, “was the only one of its type along the 
way…. The cordiality displayed [to] the passengers and handy gift bag [sic] set Atlanta’s 
welcome apart.”181 
  Although the JDC, IRO, and HIAS organized several steamships and flights carrying 
Shanghai Jews to Italy and Israel throughout the spring of 1949, their passage rarely received 
media attention.182 The physical presence of these Shanghai Jews aboard the trains on American 
soil, sealed though they were, brought an international immigration crisis to the doorsteps of 
American Jewish communities. The American Jewish media and institutional responses, 
however, illustrated the complexities and context of their own local anxieties as well as the 
complexities and context of the Shanghai Jewish refugees themselves. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE SEALED TRAINS OF 1949: ATLANTA 
As the Shanghai Jewish transport rumbled across the American South in February 1949, 
Atlanta stood ready to meet its brief visitors thanks to a last-minute call-to-action. The 
preparation for, engagement with, and coverage of the Shanghai Jewish transport provide an 
opportunity to investigate an often-overlooked post-World War II narrative not only about the 
Shanghai Jews, but also local American Jewish communities. While this time period often slips 
between the historical narratives of World War II and the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s, 
the late 1940s were neither a period of sociopolitical stasis for Atlanta Jews, nor a withdrawal 
from national and international issues. Rather, the Shanghai Jewish stop in Atlanta exhibits the 
high level of interdependent involvement by select Atlanta Jewish leadership in local, national, 
and international issues.  
  Unlike the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in New York, Atlanta’s 
institutions and individuals retain almost no archives of the Shanghai Jewish visits apart from 
media reports. Atlanta’s welcome of the Shanghai Jewish refugees provides a case study 
opportunity of how we may investigate experiences despite the dearth of primary sources. In 
order to contextualize the Southern Israelite’s accounts, we may partially reconstruct the Atlanta 
Jewish institutions’ social, political, and economic pressures through an investigation of its 
leadership. Three Atlanta Jewish leaders provide this opportunity: Adolph Rosenberg, Edward 
Kahn, and Sam Eplan. Their ties to various institutions and each other illustrate the intersecting 
pressures within Atlanta’s Jewish community. Additionally, these three individuals provide a 
glimpse into the multiple influences and decisions that also constructed the rhetorical approach 
presented by the media coverage.  
  The series of newspaper articles published by Southern Israelite articulated many Atlanta 
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Jews’ responses to the Shanghai Jews. Nonetheless, it represented only a few perspectives within 
the Atlanta and Shanghai Jewish communities. The tone and rhetoric of the Atlanta media 
coverage nonetheless reveals internal and external pressures experienced by select members of 
the local Jewish community, and provides insight into how Atlanta’s institutional leadership 
perceived of their roles and resources. By examining individuals within an institution as well as 
the public perception of an institution, we may investigate the personalities, whims, and shifting 
perspectives of the diverse individuals who composed their records. 
  Before examining the refugees’ arrival in Georgia’s capital, we first must explore the 
social, economic, and institutional environment that awaited the Shanghai Jewish refugees in 
Atlanta through the experiences and affiliations of three Atlanta Jewish leaders. With the stage 
set and the actors on cue, this chapter arrives at the Terminal Station platform and investigates 
the Shanghai and Atlanta Jews’ brief meeting on February 26, 1949. The analysis then shifts to 
the rhetoric used by Southern Israelite to interpret and present the Shanghai Jewish refugees, as 
contextualized by the social, economic, and institutional experiences of Adolph Rosenberg, 
Edward Kahn, and Sam Eplan.  
4.1 The Atlanta Jewish Context: Institutions and Individuals  
 
  The Jewish community in Atlanta expanded considerably in the one hundred years 
leading up to the arrival of the sealed transport. Within a decade of Sephardic Jews’ arrival in 
Shanghai, Atlanta’s first Jewish resident, Jacob Haas, settled in the yet-unincorporated city of 
Atlanta in 1845.183 This marked the beginning of an influx of Jewish and non-Jewish residents 
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attracted by the “Gate City,” strategically located at a railroad terminus.184 By the 1940s, 
approximately 10,000 Jews lived in the Atlanta and formed interconnected and diverse 
subcommunities of Ashkenazic, Sephardic, reform, and Orthodox affiliation.185 Jews in Atlanta 
lived within a complex sociocultural, ethnic, and economic landscape that, by the turn of the 
century, served as a hub of Jewish life for the region. Although only a fraction of the Jewish 
population in New York, Atlanta’s response to the Shanghai Jewish refugee train reflected a 
desire by some members of the community to appear responsive, philanthropic, and engaged 
with the local and international Jewish community. 
   Three Atlanta Jewish leaders took the lead in their city’s dealings related to the Shanghai 
Jewish episode: Adolf Rosenberg, editor of the Southern Israelite, which provided media 
coverage of the sealed Shanghai Jewish train; Edward Kahn, executive administrator of several 
Atlanta Jewish federations and key liaison to the United Service of New Americans (USNA); 
and Sam Eplan, Georgia Chairperson for the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) and public face of the 
Atlanta Jewish community’s response to the Shanghai Jews. These pressures and contexts come 
together at the nexus of the Shanghai Jewish and Atlanta Jewish communities’ meeting on 
February 26, 1949. 
Born in Albany, Georgia, on August 14, 1911, Adolph Rosenberg was a graduate of the 
University of Georgia. 186 The Southern Israelite hired him as a staffer in 1940 following his 
tenure with the Atlanta Journal and Atlanta Constitution and as a Washington D.C.-based 
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reporter for the United States Daily.187 Rosenberg served as founding member of the Atlanta 
Press Club and rose to national recognition when the American Jewish Press Association elected 
him president three consecutive terms in the late 1960s.188 In 1946, the Southern Israelite 
promoted Arthur Rosenberg to the position of editor, a role he occupied until his death in 1977, 
and which provided him the opportunity to run several articles related to the Shanghai Jewish 
sealed trains in March 1949.  
 Rosenberg’s Atlanta-based interests expanded beyond media to include sociopolitical 
activism, including serving as a trustee for the Gate City Lodge of B’nai B’rith, a board member 
of the Atlanta Zionist District, and a member of the Jewish War Veterans. Rosenberg also was 
active in the Atlanta chapter of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), a national institution that 
stressed an international mindset.189 The AJC charter emphasized its mission “to prevent the 
infraction of the civil and religious rights of Jews in any part of the world…[and] to secure for 
Jews equality of economic, social and educational opportunity.”190 Both Edward Kahn and Sam 
Eplan also were members of the AJC.191 
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Figure 3 Adolph Rosenberg gives Edward Kahn a statue of Moses at an unstated event, EMK 
6.013, Edward M. Kahn Family Papers, courtesy of the Cuba Family Archives for Southern 
Jewish History at the Breman Museum. 
       
 
Figure 4 Adolph Rosenberg (second from right) maintained close friendships with notable 
politicians including U.S. Senator Samuel Nunn (center), unknown date, AGF 296.001, Arthur 
Gelduldig Family Papers, courtesy of the Cuba Family Archives for Southern Jewish History at 
the Breman Museum. 
 
Rosenberg’s numerous social and political connections likely were of considerable 
assistance in remaining engaged and informed in the Atlanta Jewish community as editor of one 
of the most influential Jewish newspapers in the American South, the Southern Israelite. The 
weekly newspaper, supplemented by a monthly magazine, focused on local matters ranging from 
synagogue civic programs to births, family visits, and marriages, and served as a key connection 
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to national and international events.192 The newspaper grew out of a dearth of Jewish 
publications in the 1920s South, and by 1949, those in the Southeast who wished for local and 
international news with an emphasis on Jewish life depended almost entirely on the Southern 
Israelite. 193 While the Atlanta Journal and Atlanta Constitution periodically published articles 
related to the Atlanta Jewish community, including local Jewish leaders’ roles in a DP summit, 
neither newspaper covered the sealed refugee train with in-depth features as did the Southern 
Israelite.194 Rosenberg’s social and political affiliations beyond Southern Israelite suggest he 
was motivated to represent the Atlanta Jewish community as engaged, invested, and active 
within a larger social network, and his coverage of the Shanghai Jewish trains in March 1949 
provided the opportunity to do so.195      
  While Adolph Rosenberg served as the editorial leader of Southern Israelite and Sam 
Eplan served as the public face for the United Jewish Appeal and the Shanghai Jewish hospitality 
committee, Edward Kahn was a behind-the-scenes powerhouse of Atlanta Jewish welfare 
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administration.196 For several years leading up to the Shanghai Jewish refugee arrival, the 
Atlanta community possessed an active system of Jewish federations and welfare institutions. 
The AJC’s 1950 American Jewish Year Book lists Jewish federations for 343 cities and two state 
chapters, and ranks Atlanta as having the most number of Jewish social institutions, tied with 
five other major cities.197 Kahn served as executive director or executive secretary for all three 
Atlanta-based organizations listed in the American Jewish Yearbook, including the Federation 
for Jewish Social Services, the Jewish Welfare Fund, and the Jewish Community Council.198 
Through these three local organizations, Kahn maintained active communication with the 
national offices of the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) and United Service for New Americans 
(USNA).  
Edward Kahn had been an established pillar of Atlanta Jewish welfare administration 
since the late 1920s. Born in 1895, Kahn immigrated as a child to the United States from 
Bialystok, Poland.199 After receiving a degree in law from the Brooklyn Law School of St. 
Lawrence University and passing New York’s bar, the Jewish People’s Institute of Chicago hired 
Kahn as its Educational Director in 1920. In 1928, Kahn moved to Atlanta to serve as the 
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executive director of the Atlanta Federation for Jewish Social Service, the first of many 
administrative positions he held—often concurrently—until his retirement in 1964. 
Kahn represented a trend in American Jewish welfare funds toward centralization of 
community initiatives, an initiative that took place well before the Shanghai Jewish sealed trains 
neared Atlanta.200 Kahn served as one of four Atlanta representatives at the 1936 General 
Assembly of the National Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (NCJFWF), an 
assembly that pressured national organizations—including the JDC—to combine fundraising 
initiatives while it encouraged local communities to establish Jewish federations in support of 
European Jewish refugees.201 
Through his federation work, Kahn balanced the ongoing influx of Jewish Displaced 
Persons (DPs) with the pressures of a politically nativist environment and the challenges of 
fundraising.202 Atlanta Jewish institutions expended considerable financial and administrative 
overhead to assimilate international Jewish Displaced Persons (DPs) often perceived of as 
potential public charges.203 Immigration policy in 1949, bearing echoes of the Evian Conference 
and the failure of the Wagner-Rogers bill, was “so restrictive in nature and so impractical” that it 
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took the Atlanta Jewish federations nearly nine months to restructure their immigration programs 
to fit the dictates of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.204 
In addition to the Act’s requirement of “job and housing assurances” for each DP, 
numerous organizations within the Atlanta Jewish community provided additional services to 
equip the immigrants with skills they perceived as necessary for the immigrants to thrive in their 
new environment.205 A local USNA-affiliated institution organized classes with the Atlanta 
Section of the National Council of Jewish Women, including courses in “Americanization,” in 
order to ease the immigrants’ transition to life in Atlanta and so “that not one of the newcomers 
become a public charge.”206 
Local pressures to accommodate the influx of post-World War II immigrants, including 
Shanghai Jewish refugees, were not the only influences in the Atlanta Jewish federations’ 
operations.207 International Jewish welfare agencies also pressured and motivated the Atlanta 
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Jewish community. The national offices of the USNA coordinated the resettlement of Jewish 
immigrations in cooperation with local federation administrators, including Atlanta’s Ed Kahn. 
The USNA wrote Ed Kahn in September 1948 thanking him for a quick response to their quota 
commitment for Atlanta, but stated that the USNA was “disappointed […] to learn that your 
resettlement committee has not, at this time, accepted the quota which was established for your 
community.”208 The USNA goes on to assert that “small communities like Rutland, Vermont 
[…] and Bangor, Maine, with 265 families, [have] also accepted a monthly quota.” The 
interlinear argument is clear: Atlanta, with a far larger Jewish community than Rutland and 
Bangor, needed to contribute more financially and administratively to the larger Jewish 
community. Yet in the years leading up to the Shanghai Jewish refugees’ passage through 
Atlanta, the local Jewish community struggled to meet USNA demands while also providing 
programmatic support they considered necessary for the well-being of new immigrants. This 
included the services to “hard core cases” which the Atlanta federations had “no real experience” 
handling, including two Shanghai Jews who possessed little to no work experience or English 
skills upon their resettlement in Atlanta.209 
Programmatic expenses and pressures further intensified in spring 1949—within months 
of the sealed refugee trains—when USNA requested that Jewish Federation’s Atlanta chapter 
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increase the number of Jewish DPs settled locally.210 The immigrants’ arrival created an 
anticipated deficit of $3,362.25 in the Atlanta Federation for Jewish Social Services, and the 
Federation’s board nominated Kahn, who also served on the administrative board of the Atlanta 
Jewish Welfare Fund, to request that the Atlanta Welfare Fund supplement this deficit.211 To 
further strain matters, the amount due proved difficult to meet. In a letter to Arthur Rosichlan in 
1950, Kahn mentioned “the major problem of a decline in fundraising which complicates yet 
more this [DP] situation.”212 Ed Kahn’s experiences balancing the requests of the USNA with the 
financial and administrative requirements of immigration programs expose the ever-shifting 
social and economic pressures of the Atlanta’s institutional dynamics. The Atlanta-based 
federations led by Kahn needed positive press to demonstrate to the USNA their community’s 
participation in supporting these Jewish DPs.  
Edward Kahn was not the only Atlanta Jewish leader to feel the pressures of fundraising 
and institutional requests. Sam Eplan, the chairman of the Shanghai Jewish welcoming 
committee, found himself in both public and private conversations regarding the Atlanta Jewish 
community’s roles and responsibilities to larger Jewish affiliations. 
Samuel Leon Eplan was born to Russian immigrants in 1896, and his father, Leon Eplan, 
held several influential positions in the Atlanta Jewish community. A successful businessman, 
Leon Eplan helped establish the Young Men’s Hebrew Association, Ahavath Achim, Beth Israel, 
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and the Jewish Educational Alliance, the latter of which Edward Kahn periodically served as 
executive director.213 Additionally, Leon Eplan served as vice president of the Federation of 
Jewish Charities and reportedly held political sway among Atlanta’s Russian Jewish community 
at the turn of the century.  
 While Samuel Leon Eplan did not inherit his father’s business, he did inherit numerous 
social and political connections which he also passed on to his son, Leon Samuel Eplan.214 After 
graduating from Emory University and starting his successful career as a lawyer, Sam Eplan 
became active in numerous institutions, including the Jewish War Veterans and Ahavath Achim, 
two institutions in which Adolph Rosenberg also held membership.215 Eplan’s numerous social 
club and institutional affiliations led to personal friendships with several notable leaders among 
the Atlanta Jewish community, including Ed Kahn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          :  Eplan (second from left) and Edward Kahn (first on right) on a lake outing. EMK 6.022, 
Edward M. Kahn Family Papers, courtesy of the Cuba Family Archives for Southern Jewish 
History at the Breman Museum. 
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Among Eplan’s memberships, two of his most well-known institutional affiliations directly tie 
him to the Shanghai Jewish refugees: the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) and the Jewish 
Progressive Club. 
  As previously discussed, the UJA experienced significant fundraising challenges in 
1949, in large part due to what they considered to be “local community campaigns [falling] short 
of their 1948 performance.” 216 In December 1948, Edward Kahn received a letter from the 
United Jewish Appeal’s national office alerting the Atlanta Jewish Welfare Fund to a $10,000 
discrepancy in the local chapter’s balance owed to the UJA, totaling an unpaid balance of 
$47,000.217 With limited local funds and increasing criticism from the national office of the 
United Jewish Appeal, local leadership desperately needed positive public relations highlighting 
the Atlanta Jews’ financial and administrative contributions to the broader Jewish community. 
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Figure 6 Front page of the “Southern Israelite,” courtesy of the Digital Library of Georgia. 
 
 In March 1949, the Southern Israelite published a front-page article by editor Adolph 
Rosenberg highlighting the UJA’s fundraising campaign.218 The article’s photograph, pictured 
above, features Sam Eplan with a group of UJA affiliates, including Mrs. I. M. Weinstein, 
Executive of the UJA Women’s Division in Atlanta. The caption reads, “Viewing the telegram 
received from National U.J.A. headquarters asking for all the possible cash which Southern 
Communities [sic] can raise by March 10.” The image sits directly below another article whose 
headline reads, “Second Shanghai Refugee Train Welcomed in Atlanta.” 
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As Georgia Chairman for the UJA, the responsibility for resolving this local fundraising 
drought rested squarely on Sam Eplan’s shoulders. As demonstrated by his expansive network of 
social, political, and business contacts in Atlanta, Eplan had just the right connections to raise the 
philanthropic charge on behalf of the Shanghai Jewish refugees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A dinner hosted at the Jewish Progressive Club for war bonds during 
World War II. Sam Eplan is seated at the head table, and Rabbi David Marx of The Temple, 
Atlanta, Ga., is visible on the front row. 1939-1945, SLE 15.035, Samuel Leon Eplan Family, 
courtesy of the Cuba Family Archives for Southern Jewish History at the Breman Museum.  
 
By the time of the Shanghai Jewish transits in 1949, Sam Eplan was a well-established 
member of the Jewish Progressive Club, founded by Russian Jews in 1914 as a more budget-
friendly option to the Jewish Standard Club.219 The Progressive Club offered recreational spaces 
where dances and dinners were hosted by Atlanta Jewish leadership for a variety of different 
philanthropic and social purposes. The club also held regular board meetings to discuss financial 
solvency, outreach efforts, and both local and international affairs they considered of importance 
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to the Atlanta Jewish community. It was at one such meeting that members of the Atlanta Jewish 
institutional leadership first encountered news of the Shanghai Jewish sealed transports.  
With only 48 hours to prepare a welcoming party for the Shanghai Jews on the sealed 
train, Sam Eplan provided the first call to action during the Progressive Club’s Board of 
Governors meeting on Thursday, February 24.220 Eplan requested that Progressive Club 
members donate funds for a “special caravan train which was passing through Atlanta.”221 The 
Progressive Club members met Eplan’s request for “hospitality” on behalf of the Atlanta Jews 
with “a spontaneous burst of generosity.”222 This late-night plea by Eplan at the Progressive Club 
generated $1,000 in donations, and Eplan agreed to serve as chairman for the Shanghai Jewish 
hospitality committee.  
4.2 Atlanta Prepares its Welcome: Responses to the Refugees 
  
  Eplan quickly engaged his expansive communication network in the Atlanta Jewish 
community to solicit both institutional and individual volunteers for the hospitality committee. 
Eplan’s committee rapidly expanded to include the Tel Chai group of Hadassah, Atlanta Jewish 
War Veterans, and several women from various social clubs, including Mrs. Edwin Zaban, 
whose husband also served on Eplan’s hospitality committee and who would later become an 
administrator at the Atlanta Jewish Community Center.223 Eplan also attracted the attention of 
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Adolph Rosenberg, who threw in the support of the Southern Israelite by reporting on minutiae 
of the hospitality committee’s actions, members, and aspirations.  
The primary outcome of the hospitality committee took the form of care packages for 
each Shanghai Jewish refugee on the sealed transport. Men received cigarettes, razors and 
shaving cream, brushes, washcloths, stationary, socks; women received safety pins, stationary, 
nylons, fruit, brushes, and a cosmetic kit including compact, powder, rouge, and lipstick; and 
children’s packets included toys and games.224 All three groups received candy, gum, and soap. 
The hospitality committee prepared the packages despite the uncertainty of whether the sealed 
train’s guards would even allow the Atlanta Jewish community to interact with the Shanghai 
Jewish refugees or have their care packages delivered to the intended recipients.  
  When the Shanghai Jewish transit finally pulled into Atlanta’s Terminal station at 8:37 
p.m., four groups gathered to greet the passengers aboard the sealed train.225 They included the 
“silent and somber guards,” purportedly ordered by the F.B.I. to supervise the train stop; 
prominent Atlanta Jewish leadership, including hospitality committee members Sam Eplan, 
Erwin Zaban, and Alfred Weinstein; Atlanta Jews who successfully immigrated to the United 
States from Shanghai, including the Jacobsons family; and train attendants who would 
accompany the Shanghai Jews north.226 The “sealed” nature of the train prohibited the Shanghai 
Jews from disembarking beyond the train steps, however Jews who recently immigrated to 
Atlanta from Shanghai were allowed to stand on the train platform to greet friends, including an 
unnamed refugee who had “not yet found his social nitch [sic] in Atlanta.”227 The man, who was 
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part of the “literary set” while in Shanghai, located “more than a dozen of his former friends on 
the train,” and the as-yet-unadjusted Shanghai-Atlanta immigrant “talked long and fast to gulf 
the intervening time.”228 Meanwhile, Eplan and his committee confirmed the Shanghai Jews 
could receive their care packages, and the hospitality committee loaded them onto the train. 
With less than an hour scheduled at Terminal Station, members of the Atlanta Jewish 
community communicated through open windows, doors, and through written messages relayed 
to the back of the train. The Shanghai and Atlanta Jews spoke in numerous languages, including 
English, German, Russian, and Polish, exchanging information about relatives’ fates in the 
Holocaust and the refugees’ plans in Israel. “Iss gut bie dir in Atlanta?” asked Mr. and Mrs. Solly 
Gumpert, aunt and uncle to the Jacobsons, who had arrived in Atlanta just the year before.229 The 
Atlanta couple responded with a list of Atlanta’s abundance, including butter, cheese, and water. 
The exchange in Atlanta revealed a kaleidoscope of experiences aboard the sealed train. 
Shanghai refugee Willie Klinksburg found his cousin, Mrs. Sam Schwartz, whom he had last 
seen in Austria ten years prior. Klinksburg had lost his mother and sisters in the Holocaust, but 
he had briefly seen his father during their San Francisco stop. Schwartz gave him her address and 
the address of another cousin he could find in Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, Alex Nahimo explained to a 
few strangers standing around his window that he had escaped the increasing anti-Semitism in 
Europe by fleeing to Shanghai via Russia in the early 1930s. Nahimo worked as a barber in 
Shanghai, and his two children, Eric and Ella, joined him on the transport. Nahimo bore a tattoo 
on his arm, but it was a tattoo of his wife’s name rather than the textual marks of a concentration 
camp. Macky Gavernman had never lived in Europe. Born in Shanghai, he worked as a chief 
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clerk with the U.S. Naval Port Facilities and served as the “man in charge of the refugees” on the 
sealed train.230 Another unnamed Shanghai Jewish refugee managed to find his cousin, Herman 
Kramarski, in the Atlanta Jewish crowds. Years earlier, Kramarski fled his position as a banker 
in Germany to reside in Shanghai during the war, and had managed to secure immigration before 
his cousin. Kramarski’s obituary in the March 18, 1949, issue of the Southern Israelite closed its 
summary of Kramarski’s life by noting, “only a few weeks ago, [Kramarski] was in the Atlanta 
group which met the first train of Shanghai refugees to pass through Atlanta. He was able to talk 
with a cousin on the train who was bound for Israel.”231  
  With the care packages loaded into the storage car at the train’s rear, the transport pulled 
away from Atlanta’s Terminal Station shortly after 9:00 p.m. Though the exchange lasted less 
than an hour, the brief meeting reverberated across the pages of the Southern Israelite in the days 
that followed. The train platform transformed into a rhetorical platform, and the reporters’ 
rhetoric proclaimed the experiences and concerns of the Shanghai Jews framed within the 
experiences and concerns of Atlanta’s Jewish institutions.    
4.3 Atlanta’s Media Response to the Shanghai Jewish Transport 
The Southern Israelite offers the best insight into Atlanta Jews’ responses to the 
Shanghai Jewish sealed trains, albeit an insight presented from the perspectives of the Southern 
Israelite  reporting staff and their editor, Adolph Rosenberg, who authored the first front-page 
article on March 4, 1949.232 Throughout the three issues that featured the Shanghai Jewish 
transit, published on March 4, March 11, and March 18, the newspaper’s rhetoric emphasized 
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three aspects of the Atlanta community: its welcoming, participatory nature; the need for 
contributions to the UJA; and Atlantans’ expansive local and international connections to 
national and international Jewry. 
Rosenberg placed the most resounding rhetorical emphasis on the engaged, invested 
nature of the Atlanta Jewish community, emphasizing the warmth of the so-called Gate City. 
Headlines announcing “How Atlanta Prepared Her Welcome for the Shanghai Refugee Train” 
and “479 Israel-Bound Passengers Welcomed as Refugee-Laden Train Halts in Atlanta” both 
crowded the front page of The Southern Israelite’s March 4 issue.233 Rosenberg details the 
contents and logistics involved in the Atlanta Jewish community’s preparation of “500 bundles 
of gifts” and lists by name dozens of hospitality committee members, relatives, and institutional 
leaders who gathered to greet the refugees.234 
The articles published on March 4 lauded the Atlanta Jewish community’s efforts to 
come together through a last-minute, word-of-mouth call to action. “We [at the Southern 
Israelite] were quite impressed, as reports elsewhere in this issue indicate, by the Atlanta episode 
in the movement of the Shanghai refugee train,” read one unattributed report on March 4, going 
on to praise the “generosity and responsibility [of] Jewry in the South and elsewhere in this 
blessed country.”235  
Although the second sealed train of 228 Shanghai Jewish refugees that crossed the United 
States in March 1949 generated fewer articles than the February 1949 train, however the 
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Southern Israelite once again emphasized the engaging nature of the local community. “As with 
the first train, the Atlanta Jewish community, through Chairman Sam Eplan, had arranged a 
welcoming committee and gifts for each person aboard,” and several Atlanta women who 
originally gathered for a bridge party “surrendered their pleasure in order to pack the gift 
bags.”236 
The Southern Israelite also featured the importance of supporting the United Jewish 
Appeal, and emphasized that the Atlanta Jewish community’s response to the Shanghai Jews 
represented their local community’s financial commitment to national and international Jewish 
welfare institutions. One writer noted that, “until this year, Atlanta and the south have been far 
removed from actual contact with the bulk of Jewry’s United Jewish Appeal...another refugee-
packed train passed through Atlanta last Wednesday... there will be more... they illustrate why 
the UJA needs our continued support.”237 The front-page coverage of the assembled care 
packages sat two columns over from another Southern Israelite article announcing the 
fundraising leadership of the UJA’s 1949 Campaign, which emphasized its partnership with the 
JDC and USNA. 
The Southern Israelite emphasized not only the Atlanta Jewish community’s warm 
welcome of the refugees and its financial support of the UJA, but also the community’s role in 
reconnecting communication networks. Many Atlanta Jews transcended the sealed aspect of the 
train and exchanged addresses, family news, and letters via open windows and guarded 
platforms. The Southern Israelite’s detailed reports of conversations between the refugees and 
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Atlanta residents served the purpose of highlighting how the Atlanta Jews were connected both 
financially and familially with the larger Jewish community.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The spring 1949 passage of Shanghai Jews through Atlanta provided the opportunity for 
Atlanta Jewish institutions to explore their philanthropic and social responsibilities and 
resources. This is not to say the Southern Israelite ignored the harsh political conditions these 
refugees endured.238 One article printed an exchange between a refugee and a friend, separated 
by bars on the train: “we’re like birds in a cage [...] and you, you have your liberty.”239 And in 
July the Southern Israelite republished an article out of New York featuring a politically-toned 
analysis of the United States’ potential revocation of 200-300 visas for Shanghai Jews 
temporarily living in the U.S. 240 But beyond vague references to “diplomatic red tape,” and an 
aside from a train attendant that noted “they’d make such good Americans… it’s a shame they 
have to leave us,” The Southern Israelite did not mention Representative Celler, the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, or provide a call to political action in relation to the sealed refugee trains.241 
Instead, the restrictive immigration policy provided a backdrop by which the Atlanta Jewish 
community could emphasize its progressive, philanthropic efforts to combat the restrictive 
bureaucracy, thereby highlighting their own interest in and connection to the broader Jewish 
community.242 The Southern Israelite articles mirrored Adolph Rosenberg, Ed Kahn, and Sam 
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Eplan’s evaluation of their own resources and responsibilities in the blurred, transient reflection 
of the sealed refugee trains that passed in the night. 
The refugees shared a Jewish identity with the Jewish Atlantans, yet the Shanghai Jews’ 
temporary presence in Atlanta provided the local community with a platform on which to explore 
their own connection to and contributions toward a larger Jewish community. Articles in 
Southern Israelite argue that Jewish residents of Atlanta fulfilled their responsibility to the 
Shanghai Jews on the train, and in combining their resources to aid these refugees, illustrated 
their commitment to supporting Jewish well-being regardless of background and nation-state 
origin.243 These arguments, in turn, served as a response on behalf of Atlanta’s institutional 
leadership, arguing that despite national welfare pressures to provide additional resources, 
Atlanta’s Jewish community already was going above and beyond in their philanthropic efforts. 
Just as U.S. media reports of the Shanghai Jewish transits prompt us to explore the 
experiences and histories of Jews while in Shanghai, so too do the Shanghai Jewish refugees 
provide an opportunity to explore the experiences and histories of their all-too-brief Atlanta 
Jewish hosts. Through an emphasis on the welcome of and connection to refugees aboard the 
sealed transports, the Southern Israelite articulated local leaderships’ desires for Atlanta Jews to 
appear affiliated, contributory, and active in the broader Jewish community. Furthermore, 
institutional fundraising and philanthropic efforts reveal a high level of engagement in matters 
concerning refugees and international affairs well past the narrative bookend of World War II. 
Media coverage of the Shanghai Jews illustrated the complexities and concerns of the Atlanta 
Jewish community through their attempts to present the diverse, ongoing experiences of the 
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Shanghai Jews themselves. As will be seen through an analysis of the Aufbau’s coverage in New 
York, this reflection shifted based on the local institutions’ context, concerns, and resources.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE SEALED TRAINS OF 1949: NEW YORK 
 As the Shanghai Jewish refugees left Atlanta’s Terminal Station destined for New York, 
they headed toward the most publicized welcome of their journey across the United States.244 
The Southern Israelite surpassed the amount of coverage provided by most other cities along the 
first sealed transit’s route, however New York’s Aufbau prepared for the culmination of several 
months of articles going back to Shanghai Jewish refugee crisis and the Chinese Civil War in 
1948. Aufbau presented a more political interpretation of the sealed refugee train than did 
Southern Israelite, but a closer look at the Big Apple’s welfare institutions reflect similar inter-
organizational tensions to those of the Gate City. 
   Following a review of New York’s competitive institutional environment, this chapter 
investigates the Shanghai Jews’ Ellis Island and trans-Atlantic experiences through the 
eyewitness report of Julias Kaim. Next, the political rhetoric of Aufbau is examined in 
comparison to the Southern Israelite, exhibiting how each city’s institutional leadership 
interpreted the presence of the Shanghai Jewish refugees based on their own sociopolitical 
contexts. Finally, a brief epilogue is provided recounting legal and institutional changes in 
relation to the Shanghai Jewish community. As in the case of their previous stops, the Shanghai 
Jewish refugees’ presence on the front doorsteps of New York’s welfare institutions sparked 
public conversations about the responsibilities and resources of the local Jewish community to 
their international relations. 
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5.1 The New York Jewish Context: Institutions and Tensions 
 
 As the Shanghai Jewish transports journeyed across the United States in spring 1949, 
JDC-HIAS tensions in New York boiled over into a heated competition for publicity related to 
the Shanghai Jewish rescue. The Shanghai Jewish rescue brought HIAS-JDC’s competition for 
institutional affiliation and publicity that came to a head in February and March 1949.245 The 
International Refugee Organization (IRO) had engaged in a conversation with HIAS exploring 
whether IRO should transfer categories of Jewish refugees from the Joint Distribution 
Committee to HIAS, and the JDC had caught wind of it.246 Because the IRO reimbursed 
transportation expenses of approved Displaced Persons, it was in its interest to work with the 
lowest bidder, be it JDC or IRO. HIAS attributed the IRO’s recent interest in their institution to 
HIAS’ supposed frugality in comparison to the JDC as demonstrated during JDC’s and HIAS’ 
bidding war for chartered planes in 1948.247  
  In March 1949, the Jewish Agency in Israel responded to HIAS in a series of harshly 
toned wires, noting that “this cooperation of the two most responsible bodies dealing [with] 
immigration and resettlement has brought constructive results…your [HIAS] interference in this 
delicate important situation [has brought] incalculable harm…we request you immediately 
withdraw your offers to IRO.”248 HIAS administrators were infuriated by this, as they believed 
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HIAS should be allowed participation in Jews’ immigration to Israel and were “against a 
monopoly of work by any Jewish organization.”249  
  In the area of public relations, select members of the JDC grew increasingly frustrated 
with HIAS’ domination of media coverage, particularly in relation to Shanghai Jewish rescue 
efforts. Herbert Katzki, who served as the JDC’s Assistant Director General for Overseas 
Operations, reported that “HIAS rushing in to secure publicity is a problem we have had with us 
for a long period of time…the most flagrant cases about which we can do nothing either is where 
HIAS gives out publicity on matters on which they do not have even so much of a toe hold as 
they do [with the sealed refugee train].”250 
  Despite JDC’s disatisfaction, HIAS continued to receive press recognition regarding the 
Shanghai Jewish rescue, often at the cost of JDC. In 1949, the JDC’s public relations manager, 
Raphael Levy, wrote to the well-respected New York-based Seven Arts Feature Syndicate to 
correct points in writer Nathan Ziprin’s May 20 article. Levy found the article “equally 
misleading and irritating,” taking special offense at HIAS’s Shanghai director Meyer Birman’s 
claim in the article that HIAS was the only Jewish organization representative that assisted the 
refugees in the Shanghai ghetto during the Japanese occupation.251 “I am sure you will recall,” 
Levy wrote Ziprin, “that it was the JDC and not Hias [sic] which maintained a program 
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throughout the Japanese occupation in Shanghai.”252 It is unclear whether HIAS’ successful 
publicity prompted an increase of press releases sent by Raphael Levy in the months to come, 
but there appears to be a slight uptick in JDC media alerts related to China following this 
incident.253  
  Aufbau, for its part, handled the publicity competition between HIAS and JDC by listing 
all the contributing organizations, including the IRO, HIAS, UJA, JDC, and USNA, among the 
institutions connected with the transport, situating the IRO as the central institution.254 Aufbau’s 
initial report, however, cites HIAS instead of the JDC on its front page report in relation to the 
sealed trains. As further proof of HIAS’s successful publicity push, Aufbau listed HIAS as the 
contact center for information regarding the second sealed transport, although the mention is 
brief.255 The JDC-affiliated USNA also managed frequent mention in Aufbau writer Richard 
Dyck’s March 1949 coverage of sealed transport, where Dyck reports USNA held a small press 
conference for the first transport in San Francisco.256 USNA acted as affiliates of the JDC rather 
than direct subordinates, however the JDC administration likely preferred media credit attributed 
to USNA than HIAS.257 
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  The competition between JDC and HIAS for media reflected a much larger pattern that 
became of pressing concern to other institutions. The American Association of English-Jewish 
Newspapers, the leading media consortium that celebrated its 100th anniversary with a reception 
by President Truman, issued a scathing admonishment during its 1949 convention.258 “[We] view 
with alarm the tendency in Jewish communities of pursuing exaggerated programs of public 
relations and publicity-seeking…funds presently used for publicity purposes are excessive [and] 
there is an extreme amount of overlapping [news].”259 
  While institutional tensions most commonly erupted internally between Jewish aid 
organizations, the JDC also experienced significant organizational strain with the International 
Refugee Organization. JDC representative James Rice addressed the increasingly tense 
relationship between IRO and JDC in 1949, highlighting points of contention related to the 
Shanghai transports.260 After listing numerous challenges in their relationship with the IRO – 
including the ever-present matter of reimbursements—Rice shifts to the issue of the IRO’s 
negative attitude toward the JDC. Rice’s insightful evaluation places responsibility for the 
tensions not on the organizations as monolithic entities, but on select members of the 
organizations and the complexity of their contexts: 
I am inclined to believe that it would be an over-simplification to blame all of our 
troubles with IRO on those who are unfriendly to JDC, even though they are 
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unfortunately at top level. Why they are unfriendly is perhaps worth figuring out. 
Immediately, one needs to recognize the existence of a conscious or unconscious 
prejudice, but perhaps our own approach with the best of intentions at times may have 
contributed to this negative attitude, by not taking into consideration all of the factors 
involved in our relationship.261 
Rice’s reflections are a poignant reminder of the individual composition of institutional 
identities and the complicated, contextual pressures these individuals faced. When possible, it is 
imperative to consider the personalities and identities of the individuals who represented these 
organizations in an effort to avoid dehumanizing institutional histories.  
5.2 Shanghai Jews in New York: Ellis Island and Departure 
 
  The first sealed train arrived in Jersey City on February 27, 1949.262 Upon arrival, 
immigration officials transported the refugees via ferry to New York in groups of twenty, 
arriving on Ellis Island past midnight.263 Julius Kaim, a Shanghai Jew aboard the sealed train, 
wrote a report of the transit after landing in Italy in 1949.264 While neither the author’s intention 
nor intended audience are known, the eight-page review, which he entitled “The White Outcasts 
See America,” paints a traumatic picture of his time on Ellis Island.  
  After the refugees disembarked from the ferry, immigration guards on Ellis Island 
divided the Shanghai Jewish refugees by gender and housed them in large dormitories with 
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locked doors and barred windows. The refugees were required to leave the dormitories during 
the day and wait in two large rooms for mealtimes or visitations, and could only purchase 
supplies from a small canteen. Until the day before departure on March 2, the refugees 
reportedly had no access to phones. Visits from U.S.-based friends and family were limited to 45 
minutes, and the refugees were counted several times to ensure none left the holding area. 
  While refugees were unable to leave Ellis Island, they received visits from relatives, 
institutional leaders, and even the New York the Metropolitan Opera, who held a special 
performance for the refugees at Ellis Island. The UNSA sent representatives to meet with the 
Shanghai Jews, and Israeli Vice Consul Moshe Krone stopped by the train station for a 
publicized visit as the refugees were transferred to Ellis Island. 265 Gerhard Pechner of the 
Metropolitan Opera Company provided a report for Aufbau, covering their brief interaction with 
the refugees and the program. 266 After starting the concert with “Star-Spangled Banner,” 
Pechner and his fellow performers provided solo- and group-performances of “Carmen,” “Barber 
of Seville,” “Old Man River,” and an assortment of Verdi and Puccini.267 Everyone joined in to 
sing “HaTikvah” (The Hope), Israel’s newly-established national anthem. 
  While the refugees’ stay in New York lasted considerably longer than their stop in 
Atlanta, there were similarities, primarily related to the opportunity for brief family reunions. As 
the Shanghai Jews transferred from their last train stop to Ellis Island, Bernard Rubinstein of 
New York waited hours to meet with his brother and sister-in-law, Moritz and Sarah Rubinstein, 
whom he had not seen in 25 years. Moritz Rubinstein lost his 19-year-old son to typhus while in 
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China, and Bernard Rubinstein was unable to bring their 86-year-old father to the reunion due to 
sickness. It is unknown whether Moritz Rubinstein and his father were ever reunited. Fred 
Kochman and his two brothers also attempted to see their father. Because the brothers were born 
in Worms and not Upper Silesia, they were able to immigrate to the United States earlier than 
their father, who was restricted due to the immigration quota. Despite having no friends or 
family in Israel, their 63-year-old father was required to leave his sons behind in New York and 
continue across the Atlantic Ocean as part of the sealed transport. 
  On March 2, 1949, the refugees were transferred to the S.S. General Stewart, bound for 
Naples, Italy, where the refugees would then travel their separate ways to Israel and scattered 
locations in Europe. As they rode on the ferryboat to the General Stewart, Kaim reports that the 
refugees glimpsed the Statue of Liberty en route to the steamship. One refugee purportedly 
quipped, “Look at an out-of-fashion lady.”268 
  As the refugees walked from the ferry to S.S. General Stewart, they passed by two rows 
of armed soldiers and several WAC representatives. Once on board, they again were separated 
by gender. Kaim presented the trans-Atlantic journey as far more challenging than the 
transcontinental sealed train. The S.S. General Stewart purportedly did not have a full working 
crew due to the IRO’s attempt to fit as many refugees as possible on board. Because of the short-
staff crew, the IRO required refugees under the age of 60 to pick up ship duties, ranging from 
cooking and cleaning to painting the decks. The tasks were supervised by designated members of 
the refugee community, whom Kaim claimed were “[mostly] bearers of USSR passports.” 269 
Just days after departure, the U.S. Army liaison on board assembled a meeting in response to 
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many refugee protests, following which couples could have meals in their room together and 
painting duties were taken off the task list. Several days later, the refugees landed in Naples to 
continue their journeys, some stayed in Italy, others went to Israel and elsewhere in Europe. 270  
  Kaim’s eyewitness account of the sealed transit remained largely ignored by the general 
public. The IRO sent JDC-Shanghai director Adolph Glassgold a copy of Kaim’s manuscript, 
likely intended for publication, and Glassgold passed it on to the JDC office in New York, 
calling it “literary bile.”271 Glassgold seemed significantly concerned by Kaim’s depiction of the 
refugees’ treatment, circling Kaim’s description of train stops as “cattle stations” and the 
organization of the refugees in Ellis Island as “cattle counting.” 272 While Kaim’s report does not 
contradict Aufbau’s articles, a quick glance reveals that the newspaper’s rhetorical intentions 
were quite different from those of Kaim. Aufbau had a different story to tell, based on their own 
evaluation of what symbolic role the Shanghai Jewish refugees played in the New York 
community’s sociopolitical environment, and what resources Aufbau could generate in support of 
the refugees and in service to the larger political debates taking place on the floors of Congress. 
5.3 New York, New York: Spreading the News about the Shanghai Jews 
 
  The German-language, New York-based newspaper Aufbau, founded in 1934, boasted an 
international circulation that peaked at 50,000 weekly.273 Notable political and academic 
authors—including Hannah Arendt and Albert Einstein, the latter of whom periodically served 
                                                 
270 Kaim does not list a specific landing date in Naples, Italy. 
271 Letter from Adolph Glassgold (JDC- Shanghai) to Robert Pilpel, Re: Letter of Complaint, 
April 8, 1949, China: Administration, Publicity, 458988, Joint Distribution Committee Archives. 
272 Kaim, “Outcasts,” page 3, JDC Archives. 
273 Steven Lowenstein, Frankfurt on the Hudson: The German-Jewish Community of Washington 
Heights, 1933-1983, Its Structure and Culture (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 
127. 
95 
on Aufbau’s advisory board—lent the Aufbau influence in select policy circles, and editor 
Manford George engaged U.S. politicians through open letters, as in the case of the Shanghai 
Jewish evacuation.274 While Aufbau’s German language restricted its readership, its large 
circulation reflected its wide influence and underscores a population boom in New York City 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s, during which time an estimated 2,000,000 Jews lived in 
New York.275 The breadth of Aufbau’s coverage, including the economy, culture, sports, 
international news, and a semi-regular  feature, “Die Westküste” (West Coast), indicates the 
newspaper’s interest in appealing to a transnational, eclectic Jewish community. 
  Growing from a small German-Jewish Club newsletter, Aufbau became a primary source 
of Europe-focused news in the years preceding and during the war, running dozens of articles 
listing Holocaust survivors and personals seeking news about family members. Aufbau provided 
a space of connection where its large readership engaged with preexisting communication 
networks and reinforced kinship relations.   
  Far from the near-monopoly the Southern Israelite possessed in Atlanta, Aufbau’s 
circulation competed with dozens of Jewish newspapers in the New England region. Similar 
media outlets included Forverts (Forward) and Der Tog (The Day), both Yiddish-language 
newspapers, and the German-language Jewish Way.276 Yet Aufbau’s world-renowned 
contributors and politically-active premise, as well as its established track record of covering 
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news of the Holocaust and of Jewish refugees, prepared it to be at the center of New York’s 
media coverage of the Shanghai Jewish refugee crisis.  
 Aufbau reporters portrayed the Shanghai Jewish refugees in a highly political framework, 
reflecting the news source’s administration and its influence in previous political debates. 
Emanuel Celler, the Jewish New York congressman who inquired about the plight of the 
Shanghai Jews in spring 1948, served on Aufbau’s advisory board for several years prior to the 
sealed transit.277 The newspaper’s bipartisan advisory board grew with the addition of 
Republican Congressman Jacob Javits, who appeared on the advisory board in the months 
leading up to the Shanghai Jews’ arrival in New York.278 Though Celler and Javitz belonged to 
different political parties, they voiced their joint concern regarding the plight of the 5,000 Jews 
stranded in Shanghai and pushed for a political solution to the refugee situation.279 Beginning, 
presumably, with the JDC’s response to Celler’s request for information on the Shanghai Jewish 
situation, Aufbau detailed the political three-ring circus between Celler’s H.R. 6760, the 80th 
Congress, and the stubbornly restrictive DP Act of 1948.  
Aufbau dedicated its entire front page on November 18, 1948, to the plight of Shanghai 
Jews. Both Celler and Javits contributed English-language letters to the editor, with Celler 
thanking the Aufbau for its coverage and adding that, “You are doing a good job, I think, to get 
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Congress to act in this matter of life and death.”280 Javits, meanwhile, made a direct appeal to the 
Truman administration for its support in pushing an expanded DP bill through the 80th 
Congress.281 Other smaller German-language articles decorate the front page, including 
soundbites from the JDC and World Jewish Congress concerning the matter. An unnamed female 
contributor describing hellacious conditions in Shanghai in the face of approaching Japanese 
force; and a map depicts the position of the CCP in relation to Shanghai, noting a site of potential 
evacuation. All are arranged around the bold header: “Rettet die Shanghai-Refugees” (Save the 
Shanghai Refugees).282 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The contributors who described the plight of these Shanghai Jews tailored their 
presentation of the Shanghai Jewish community to fit the political language of the DP bill. 
Despite the diversity of the remaining 5,000 Shanghai Jews—including Russians who had lived 
in Shanghai years prior to the Holocaust and thereby fell outside the DP parameters—Aufbau 
largely depicted the Shanghai Jews as European refugees, a tactic more evident in its English 
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articles than the German-language reports. If the Shanghai Jews were framed as Holocaust 
survivors, rather than a complex mix of nation-states, experiences, and identities, the tragedies of 
the Holocaust would lend pathos to the political plea, increasing its chance of success.  
Both Southern Israelite and Aufbau provided calls to action, Aufbau’s call was far more 
political in nature. The New York media outlet requested that organizations and individuals sign 
their names on a blanket petition in support of Aufbau’s political campaign on behalf of the 
Shanghai Jews.283 As 1948 came to a close and Celler’s bill struggled for support, Aufbau’s 
political emphasis of the Shanghai Jewish community increased, culminating in a series of 
articles and photo essays surrounding the first sealed train’s arrival in New York in February 
1949.  
 Aufbau tracked the initial sealed transport beginning with a February 25 front-page report 
of the from S.S. General Gordon in San Francisco.284 Each stop along the journey provided a 
platform for Aufbau to reiterate its editorial criticism of U.S. immigration laws and place 
pressure on politicians to generate policy change, and they ran feature articles on February 25, 
March 4, and March 11. 
Aufbau employed pathos in its political rhetoric, listing each transport passenger’s name, 
age, and nation of origin in the February 25 article.285 This served to notify family members of 
the refugees’ stop in Ellis Island, but also aligned the identities of the Shanghai Jews with the 
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experiences of Holocaust survivors who were listed in Aufbau articles following World War 
II.286  
 
Figure 9 Courtesy of “Aufbau,” Leo Baeck Institute Archives 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The rhetoric in Aufbau is evident in both text and visuals. In one image, the photographer 
captures a scene of relatives waiting to visit their Shanghai Jewish transit relations, featuring the 
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bars of the holding room centrally in the shot.287 The photographer’s caption under the image 
reads, “Hinter den Gittern” (behind bars).288 With descriptions of the Holocaust startlingly recent 
in many Aufbau readers’ minds, the visual rhetoric serves two purposes. It both aligns the tragic 
journey of the Shanghai Jews with the tragic circumstances of the Holocaust, and it places 
responsibility for the criminalization of these refugees on discriminatory legislation. As quoted 
by the Aufbau, one onlooker refers to the Shanghai Jews’ brief time in America as “einer legalen 
Fiktion” (a legal fiction).289 
  Along with Aufbau’s political message, the newspaper highlighted the importance of 
fundraising, although not to the extent of Southern Israelite. As an institution, Aufbau regularly 
contributed to the United Jewish Appeal and featured the media outlet’s fundraising successes. In 
January 1948, Aufbau reported that it raised more funds for an emergency Hanukkah fund for 
children than any other listed society, including the Theodor Herzl Society, the Leo Baeck Youth 
Group, and synagogues across the country.290   
  Whereas the Atlanta Jewish media emphasized fundraising over politics, so too did 
Aufbau emphasize political calls to action over fundraising. This strategy is largely due to the 
influence of its advisory board’s political members and in response to threats presented by 
nativist immigration laws. Through a careful evaluation of its own local context, Aufbau 
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leveraged its political resources to connect the story of a few hundred Shanghai Jews to a larger 
political story of restrictive political legislation.  
5.4 Across the Atlantic: Post-Transit Experiences 
 
  In June 1950, the 81st Congress passed H.R. 4567 and fulfilled the long-awaited hopes of 
thousands of Shanghai Jews waiting for immigration to the United States.291 The house bill 
amended the restrictive Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and authorized 25,000 non-quota 
immigration visas, including 4,000 visas eligible to Shanghai Jews.292 The amendment came at a 
point when Adolph Glassgold reported to the JDC office in New York that the remaining Jews in 
Shanghai were “rather hysterical” due to ongoing air raids and JDC’s plans to liquidate its 
Shanghai office.293  
 The Shanghai Jewish community was not alone in its celebration of this amendment. 
President Harry Truman expressed “very great pleasure” at the act brought about “by the 
combined efforts of both political parties, supported by groups and organizations broadly 
represented by all parts of our country.”294 While the law impacted over 400,000 visas total, 
Truman nonetheless made special mention in his public statement of the “4,000 European 
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refugees who fled to the Far East to escape one form of totalitarianism and must now flee before 
a new tyranny.”295 The JDC, HIAS, and IRO, tasked with exploring the Displaced Persons Act of 
1948 for cracks and holes in its legislative walls, now had a slightly larger crevice through which 
to assist the passage of hundreds of Jewish refugees. 
  While a tremendous legislative victory, the immigration process nonetheless took 
months, if not years, for many Shanghai Jews.296 Hopeful Jewish immigrants to the United States 
also faced additional complications, especially those who did not hold residence in one of the 24 
nations listed in H.R. 4567 amendment. In February 1951, 63 Baghdadi Jews remained in 
Shanghai, with 44 awaiting immigration to the United States, and only four listing Israel as their 
site of desired resettlement.297 JDC experienced challenges in determining how to categorize 
these resident Shanghai Jews for U.S. visa applications. Because the only listed options on one 
JDC fact sheet included “Chinese White Race quota” and “Iraquian [sic] quota,” it is likely they 
were ineligible for the recently expanded Displaced Persons quotas of 1950.298 Russian Jews also 
faced similar delays in comparison to the European displaced persons community, and Jacob 
Friend’s wife waited several years in Israel before joining her husband and step-daughter in the 
United States in 1955.  
  Between January 1949 and the time of the sealed trains in February and March 1949, the 
JDC and IRO evacuated 1,470 Jews from Shanghai, leaving a core group of 2,387 still in 
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Shanghai, purportedly divided in demographics between European DPs and long-time 
residents.299 By 1950, just shy of 2,000 hopeful emigrants remained in Shanghai.300 JDC and 
IRO wished to avoid another series of sealed trains, stating in February 28, 1949, that there 
would “be no further transports of this kind as both IRO and JDC are opposed to this arduous 
way of travel.”301 A later report notes that “a few blundering army officers and a lack of 
sympathetic consideration by New York immigration officers turned many of these refugees into 
bitter critics of America…the reaction to American treatment was so bad, and the difficulties 
encountered so great, the IRO has abandoned plans to send other refugees to Europe via the 
United States.”302 The institutions organized and funded a third sealed transport in June 1950.303 
  This final train, as in the case of its predecessors, generated a wave of national media 
coverage, enhanced by an immigration appeal made by refugees aboard the sealed transport.304 
The train arrived in New York on May 23, 1950, just weeks prior to President Truman’s signing 
of the expanded DP legislation. The USNA, likely aware of the legislation’s impending passage, 
successfully argued on behalf of the 106 refugees aboard this third transport to delay deportation 
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from Ellis Island on the grounds that “most of them would be eligible for admission to the 
United States.”305 Even after the amendment’s passage, however, these stranded refugees’ cases 
were left unprocessed and therefore visa-less. Twelve of the refugees came forward to hold a 
press conference on Ellis Island and “expressed horror [at] going back to Germany, where many 
among them had been in concentration camps or where members of their families had been 
slain.”306 To their disappointment, U.S. Attorney General J. Howard McGrath determined the 
refugees could not await their immigration visa processing in the United States, and the refugees 
set sail from New York to Germany on June 21, 1950, nonetheless “confident of admission to 
[the] U.S. soon.”307    
  The passing of HR 4567 also did not grant reprieve to many of the “hard-core” cases of 
the remaining Shanghai Jews, including elderly residents and those with tuberculosis and mental 
challenges.308 At the close of 1949, 500 “hard core” cases, including elderly and those with 
mental and physical disabilities, still remained in Shanghai. 309 Their disputed fates, unresolved 
due to ineligible national origin and cost of care, sparked some of the most tragically-toned 
conversations among institutional staff of the JDC. The hard core cases attracted attention 
beyond the JDC, including the Jewish Agency in Israel as well as the IRO, thanks to the personal 
prodding of James Rice.310 While Israel accepted admittance for the hard-core cases just weeks 
shy of the U.S. amendment to the DP Act, by 1953 there remained several hard core Shanghai 
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Jews whose destinations were parsed among various countries with the assistance of the JDC.311 
Their stories are perhaps the most underrepresented of all Shanghai Jewish experiences in both 
archives and academic narrative, and while outside the scope of this research, warrant a full 
investigation. 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
  The JDC closed its Shanghai office in the summer of 1950 and transferred administration, 
and a monthly stipend, to the locally-based Council of the Jewish Community.312 HIAS’s 
director, Meyer Birman, successfully emigrated from China in 1949, and the remaining Shanghai 
Jews looked to the Council in the departing wake of the JDC and HIAS. After the S.S. Anna 
Salen departed Shanghai in late summer 1950 with approximately 1,200 Shanghai Jews—a trip 
with considerable negative ramifications, as the steamship was designed to accommodate only 
800-900 passengers—the Shanghai Jewish community stood fewer than 500 members, 
“consisting of [those] who are non-emigrable and who will probably have to remain there for the 
rest of their days.”313 The expenditure of resources and administration to assist such a small 
population compelled JDC to dissolve its Shanghai branch, though the decision to do so sent 
ripples of fear and frustration through the remaining Shanghai Jewish community.314 The closure 
also frustrated IRO representatives in China, who presumably served as administrative contacts 
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upon the dissolution of the JDC’s local chapter.315 
  Although the JDC closed its Shanghai branch, the remaining Jewish community was not 
wholly without representation in China. A local JDC program, conducted in Hong Kong by Mr. 
Kadoorie and Mr. Citrin, assisted with remaining immigration requests.316 The closure of the 
JDC nonetheless was unsettling to many directly involved in the Shanghai operations, and 
Adolph Glassgold, the JDC’s final director in Shanghai, continued to push back his departure 
until the summer of 1950 despite the encouragement of the JDC to leave his post in the face of 
potential transportation blackouts and air raids. Upon his eventual departure, Glassgold 
conducted his return to New York in the opposite direction of thousands of Jews whose passage 
he facilitated during his time in Shanghai. He planned to travel westward, visiting Israel and Italy 
along the way, the reverse order of the refugees sealed aboard the 1949 transports. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
  The stories of the Shanghai Jews who crossed the United States aboard sealed 
trains in 1949 are fragmented, discordant, and incomplete. Their experiences while in the United 
States come to us through newspapers, institutional records, and brief quotations, and all are 
presented in the timbre and tone of American Jewish communities who related their journeys. 
These numerous slivers of life may appear to be too isolated to resonate with anyone but those 
with the most specialized of interests. After all, how can the passage of fewer than 1,000 Jews 
from Shanghai in 1949 tell us anything about changes over time, about alternative perspectives 
of this era? Why burden ourselves with the challenges of a transnational history that could, more 
concisely, be told as a local story of Shanghai, Atlanta, or New York? 
  The transnational Jewish communities of this brief study address these questions in more 
than one way. Their experiences teach us to challenge monolithic representations of refugees. 
Rather than framing the Shanghai Jewish community solely through the perspectives of 
European Jews escaping the Third Reich, investigations of the Shanghai Jewish community 
through memoirs and visual culture reveal a diversity of ethnicities, nation-states, languages, 
religious denominations, and socioeconomic statuses. The members of this community did not 
default to a simplistic Jewish identity, but responded to their ever-shifting context based on the 
resources and networks specific to each individual, calling upon similarities or differences as the 
situation warranted. 
  This study also attempts to fracture assumptions that refugees were simply buffeted by 
external conditions. Rather, in the face of few choices and restricted rights, Shanghai Jews 
expressed their wishes and explored their emigration options in such a way that international 
institutions, including the IRO and JDC, were forced to react to the refugees’ decisions. In a 
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story that would, at first glance, suggest that institutions and environments dictated the outcome 
and that refugees acquiesced to their demands, this case study suggests, at times, the reverse. In 
this transnational, complex story, the refugees “[knew] they [were] taking a chance and [were] 
ready to take the risk.”317 
  The Shanghai Jewish sealed transports also exhibit the interdependence of transnational 
communities. While the Shanghai refugees were largely kept silent by the sealed nature of the 
immigration trains, their physical presence on the doorsteps of Atlanta and New York’s Jewish 
communities provided a platform by which American Jewish institutional leaders could discuss 
their own roles and responsibilities. The Shanghai Jewish refugees provided American Jewish 
institutions with the opportunity to publicly discuss their own environments and questions, and 
the American Jewish media, in turn, provided representation and resources for the Shanghai 
Jews. 
  The ecological differences between Atlanta’s tightly-knit institutional network stands in 
sharp contrast to the notable tensions between the New York offices of the JDC and HIAS.318 
The rhetorical differences in each city’s media coverage also reflects differences in available 
resources. The high-profile nature of New York Jewish leadership, including Emmanuel Celler, 
and the Aufbau’s large circulation and internationally-celebrated contributors all combined to 
create the means and resources to make a political call to action on behalf of the Shanghai Jews. 
Atlanta’s Jewish community, more modest in both population and reputation, based their call to 
action in local fundraising efforts. While the environments, institutions, and media responses 
varied between New York and Atlanta institutions, they both expressed a responsibility to the 
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Shanghai Jewish refugees, and they both found that the interaction with the refugees provided a 
platform by which the American Jewish communities could express their own contexts and 
concerns.319 
  Perhaps the greatest lesson of this brief study is methodological in nature. Wars, ports, 
and nation-states erect real and conceptual barriers, but their construction is also permeable. By 
moving beyond the end of World War II, and beyond the ports of both China and the United 
States, we discover the extensive, transnational nature of these communities and communication 
networks that illuminate the decisions and contexts of refugees and residents alike. The 
communication networks, furthermore, highlight individual experiences within institutions and 
exhibit the differences of personality and approach inside each organization. Media, memos, and 
memoirs combine to remind us of the humor and humanity of those tasked with navigating 
challenging, and often tragic, circumstances. 
  Just as these Shanghai Jewish refugees operated within a far larger, more complex 
environment of choices and resources than the sealed nature of their transport suggests, so too 
does this modest case study connect with far larger narratives of immigration policy, modern 
Jewish history, and transnational communication networks. The ways in which many individuals 
within this era approached their environments instruct me, in turn, of how to approach my own 
historical practice: to explore cracks in the narrative walls of policy and perception, and to follow 
the echoes of experiences beyond the scope of ports and wars. 
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